Essays in Public and Labor Economics. by Houghton, Kendall




Presented to the Department of Economics
and the Division of Graduate Studies of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements





Title: Essays in Public and Labor Economics.
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of




Grant McDermott Core Member
Laura Leete Institutional Representative
and
Andrew Karduna Interim Vice Provost for Graduate Studies
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Division
of Graduate Studies.
Degree awarded June 2021
ii







Title: Essays in Public and Labor Economics.
This dissertation considers three topics in public and labor economics.
Chapter I introduces the work. In Chapter II, I consider the gender wage
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This work contributes to our understanding of human behavior and
public policy in the United States.
In Chapter II, I contribute to work on the gender wage gap in the
United States. The gender wage gap in the United States is persistent and
especially pronounced at the top of the distribution. Recent worker surveys
suggest this gap partly driven by a di↵erence in average work hours, even
between men and women employed full-time. This paper examines gender
di↵erences in work timing and elasticity using hourly data on tech worker
activity. I find both genders work outside the traditional work week, but
men work more than women on nights and weekends — times when children
are typically present in the home. To isolate the impact of children at
home, I examine how work activity varies in response to unexpected winter
weather public school closures. Women respond to these unexpected breaks
in childcare by reducing work activity by 34%. Male work activity does not
respond to these unexpected breaks. These results are consistent with the
emerging theory that men and women in high-wage professions are working
di↵erent amounts and suggest asymmetric childcare responsibilities could be
a reason for the di↵erence.
Chapter III evaluates the interaction between Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) benefit disbursement and drug-related fatal
automobile collisions. Distributing SNAP benefits on days other than
the first of the month, adding an additional income shock to the monthly
1
calendar, increases the number of drug-related fatal automobile collisions
by 1.21 percent. A one-percentage point increase in the share of SNAP
benefits distributed on a day leads to a .2 percent increase in the number
of drug-related fatal automobile collisions. This estimation utilizes a novel
dataset of variation in SNAP distribution dates across states, and switches
in distribution date regimes within states over time to identify the causal
relationship.
Chapter IV provides a general empirical test of tax invariance (TIV).
When a 25 percent tax remitted by manufacturers was eliminated in
Washington state and the retail excise tax was simultaneously increased
from 25 to 37 percent—a shift intended to be revenue-neutral—TIV did not
hold. Manufacturers kept two-thirds of their tax savings instead of passing
all their savings through to retail firms via lower prices as predicted by TIV.
One-third of the retail tax increase was passed on to consumers via higher





CHILDCARE AND THE NEW PART-TIME: GENDER GAPS IN
LONG-HOUR PROFESSIONS
2.1. Introduction
The median female worker in the United States makes approximately
$10,000 less than the median male worker in the United States [1]. Over the
course of a lifetime, this di↵erence in earnings leads to a significant wealth
gap. Women hold 65% of U.S. student loan debt1 [3] and are more likely to
live below the poverty line at every age2 [5]. A large body of work seeks to
explain the persistent earnings gap (for a thorough review, see [6]), and finds
that a di↵erence in weekly work hours can explain much of the di↵erence.
Historically, the di↵erence in work hours was largely a di↵erence in
part-time versus full-time employment. As technology has made it possible
to work remotely, workers have been faced with the both the possibility and,
in some cases expectation, that they work much more than traditional full-
time. This phenomenon has been documented in the press ([7]; [8]; [9]), and
described in surveys of the workforce ([10]; [11]). This high-hour equilibrium
is present in the top of the distribution and features strongly in professions
that reward wage as a strongly nonlinear function of work hours [12].
Female MBAs and JDs self-report working more than 40 hours a week,
but less than the hours self-reported by men in the same samples ([11], [13]).
1For the past 18 years, women have earned 57% of bachelor degrees in the U.S. [2].
2For individuals aged 65 to 74, 9.8% of women are in poverty and 7.7% of men. For
individuals above the age of 75, 8% of men and 12.1% of women live in poverty, although
this statistic is confounded by more women living later in life than men [4].
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Self-reports from workers across all fields indicate this gender di↵erence is
a broad phenomenon [10]. In this paper, I use high-frequency records of
tech worker programming activity to verify the presence of work activity
outside of the traditional 9am to 5pm period in STEM professions. I then
document precisely when during the week and day men are participating in
programming labor and women are not, and find that women are less likely
than men to work on nights and weekends.
Women may have a greater taste for leisure than men, and cultural
factors may make leisure more rewarding during these hours. On the other
hand, these are also times when formal childcare is less readily available.
Female labor force participation is inextricably connected to childcare
availability [14]. We know that the percent of mothers who work more than
forty hours a week is significantly below the percent in other demographic
groups, and the gap between the share of mothers and the share of non-
mothers participating in these hours has been increasing since the 1990’s
([15]; [10]; [11]). This is suggestive that childcare is the factor that limits
mothers from working the hours that women without children and men are
working.
In order to separate childcare availability from other potential
mechanisms, I consider shocks to childcare availability. In my estimation,
I exploit winter weather public school closures as a natural experiment in
which childcare is unexpectedly unavailable. I consider female and male
work activity on these days.
Male work activity does not respond to unexpected shocks in the
public school calendar, but female work activity does. Female activity
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decrease by 34% on these days. These results are consistent with a story
that households plan for childcare external to the household, but that
women are more likely to be responsible for within-household childcare when
external childcare is unavailable.
It is possible that the parental status of the women in my data is
systematically di↵erent than the parental status of the men in my data. I
could, for example, be comparing single men to women with children. In
order to increase the likelihood that I am comparing men with children to
women with children, I augment my primary data with estimated age for a
subset of individuals. I use publicly available information from LinkedIn to
estimate the individual’s age using their education levels and corresponding
graduation years3. I match individuals by limiting my LinkedIn search
to those working in STEM fields, in the geographic location listed in my
primary dataset, with a matching name and company a liation. When
age is included, the average e↵ect for women disappears, and a much larger
e↵ect for women between the age of 30 and 40 emerges.
The wage gap is widest among college graduates and at top of the
wage distribution [17]. Science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)
are often highlighted as fields in which increased gender parity is wanted,
but increases in the number of female college students enrolled in these
majors have not been reflected in the workforce [18]. Female STEM
graduates are less likely to take STEM jobs, and are more likely to leave
the STEM workforce. Women who stay in STEM advance more slowly, and
are less likely to hold management positions. These gaps have been resistant
3“Scraping” data from LinkedIn in this manner has been ruled legal by federal courts
[16]
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to intervention [19]. A lessened ability to work long hours may be the cause
of the slow advancement and lower participation rate. My work suggests
that in STEM careers, and perhaps other high-hour professions, the wage
gap is not only an issue of childcare during traditional work hours, but all
the other times as well.
2.2. Data
2.2.1. GitHub
In order to document worker activity at a precise timescale, I use a
publicly available record of worker activity from GitHub, a version-control
platform with more than 40 million users repo. Workers who use technology
use version control to manage solo and collaborative projects. A basic
example of version control involves saving multiple versions of a file to a
local hard drive. Consider a common example of this practice, for File.
A user might save this file as File1, File2, File3, etc. as both minor and
major changes are made to the file. For complex projects, version control
software provides a more user-friendly version of this practice. The worker
first creates one file. After making changes to this file, the worker saves
these changes using version control. These changes, and the lines of code
or text within them, are tracked by the version control software in order to
allow the worker to return to any previous version at any point. Crucially
for this project, these changes as well as other activity on the version control
platform are tracked by time and date. I am able to exploit the time-date
system of tracking to create a dataset that describes the types of users
interacting with code in a given time period.
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FIGURE 2.1. GitHub Activity by Time of Day and Day of Week
In GitHub, activity is referred to as an event. For a detailed list
and description of these events see Table A.2. Table A.1 summarizes how
frequently each type of activity occurs. The second most common type of
event is a “push” event, which is when a user takes file changes from their
local computer to the remote copy of the file. Inside the push event details,
I am able to observe each time the user has made a change to that file on
their local machine. These local changes are “commits”, the most common
event type, and I observe portions of their content and the timestamp of
when the file was saved. Together, commits and push events represent
70% of the data. In my analysis, I limit my sample to these events. In
the appendix, Figures A.1 and A.2, show activity across the day for each
event type. Figure A.1 displays this for each event type, and Figure A.2
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displays this for the ten most common events. All events outside the top
ten represent less than 1% of the data. The data pattern for all types is
qualitatively similar, with less noise as event type frequency increases.
I access the record of GitHub activity from two sources, GitHub
Archive and GitHub Torrent. GitHub Archive is log of all public events that
happen on GitHub. This data source is updated hourly and covers activity
from 2011 forward. GitHub Torrent is meant to capture the relationships
between the di↵erent aspects of GitHub – the relationships between users,
files and users, and files with each other. This dataset records the stated
location of users as well. GitHub torrent is updated monthly and covers
2013 to present.
I gather user name and event activity for all events except for commits
from GitHub Archive. I use GitHub Torrent to collect the user location and
commit activity. I merge these datasets together using the login name of
the user. The raw data is processed minimally. The timestamp of activity
is standardized to Universal Coordinated Time in both GitHub Archive
and GitHub Torrent. In order to track when the user is working during
the day, I adjust timestamps by the timezone provided in their geographic
information. In the appendix, Figure A.3 shows the daily activity of users
by timezone after this transformation. Each timezone follows a similar daily
pattern.
I use two subsamples of the worker data for this analysis. I consider
activity between 2017 and 2019 for users with a stated location in the
United States and an identifiable first name. This sample is 145,333 users.
I also analyze the sample of users with a stated location in Seattle or
8
Bellevue, Washington. There are 4,392 users in this smaller sample. Please
see Table 2.1 for summary statistics on these samples, including the total
number of observations and the gender compositions.
TABLE 2.1. Data Description
United States Seattle
Total Observations 59,400,105 4,493,618
Total Users 145,333 4,392






Gender Composition Women Men Women Men
No. Users 18339 126994 340 4,052
Percent of Users 12.6% 87.4% 7.7% 92.3%
Mean Users Observed Per Week 2931 22068 197 2259
Mean Users Observed Per Day 984 8584 70 794
This table describes the data for the United States sample and the sample for Seattle and
includes the total number of observations and the total number of users. I include a description
of the number of observations per user across di↵erent percentiles of frequency in the data.
The final portion of the table provides various descriptors on the gender composition of the
data.
2.2.2. Gender Imputation
I impute gender for each user. In the GitHub data, I am able to
identify the first name of users who provide a first name in their profile
information. In order to impute gender for each user, I use the the R
package, ‘gender’, which uses Census and Social Security Administration
data to predict the gender of an individual when given their first name and
geographic location [20]. I provide the first name of the user as collected
from GitHub Archive and the geographic location as collected from GitHub
Torrent.
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2.2.3. School Snow Closure Records
In my analysis of winter weather school closures, I use a subsample
of users in Seattle, Washington. I use the Twitter page of Seattle Public
School District to identify snow and winter weather school closure dates.
Most school districts do not maintain public, formal records of closures
due to snow. Fortunately, Seattle Public School District maintains an
active Twitter page that communicates news of school closures, delays, and
changes to activity schedules. The tweets announcing these decisions remain
on the Twitter page for the district. I locate relevant tweets on the Seattle
Public School District page and verify these dates by searching for tweets
by other users on the same day documenting the school closure and winter
weather conditions.
2.2.4. LinkedIn
As part of my robustness analysis, I impute the age of users to identify
likely parents. Through the GitHub data, I am able to identify user first
name, last name, and company a liations. With this information, I identify
these users in LinkedIn using a web-based LinkedIn URL finder application,
PhantomBuster. From the LinkedIn profiles, I scrape user education and
dates of graduation using Selenium4. Using this information, I impute a
likely age for the users.5
4For more information on the scraping process and code, see my co-authored work on
COVID-19 with Ben Hansen, Grant McDermott, and Caroline Weber
5I assume individuals graduate with a Bachelor’s degree at age 22, with a Master’s
degree at age 25, and with a PhD at age 30. The earliest listed degree and graduation
date is used, as deviations from the average education path timing become more likely
over time.
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2.3. Overall Work Patterns
I first document the typical behavior of all users in my data. Given
the high frequency of the data, it is possible to track the daily work schedule
of the average user. In Figure 2.1, I plot the total amount of activity that
occurs for all users on any given day of the week for every hour of that day.
I scale this total amount of activity by dividing by the max total amount of
activity observed for a day-of-week, hour-of-day combination.
On average, users are most active between 2pm and 3pm on
Wednesday and Thursday. Activity is lowest between the hours of 1am and
7am across all days. On workdays, activity increases most sharply between
8am and 9am. There is a dip in activity between 11am and 1 o’clock that
is consistent with the lunch hour. Activity decreases most sharply between
5pm and 6pm. This decrease is most pronounced on Friday.
Evenings follow a similar pattern across the week. Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, Thursday, and Sunday nights are closely related as are Friday
and Saturday nights. These grouping correspond to nights before work days
and nights before weekend days. Monday and Tuesday night have the most
activity, followed by Wednesday, then Thursday, and then Sunday. For the
nights that occur on a work day and before a work day, there is a decrease
in activity as the week progresses. After 5pm, the most work occurs at 9pm,
regardless of day. Friday and Saturday are very similar from 8pm onward.
2.4. Description of Male and Female Work Habits
I begin the analysis of gender di↵erence by examining the di↵erences in
male and female work timing across the day and week.
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2.4.1. Empirical Method
For my analysis, I use the following general specification, which
compares the activity for men and women over some time scale. For the
following equation, I am using the example of comparing male and female
activity across the work week.






 dFemaleg ⇥Dayt + ✏tgd
Activity is a general term that refers to the combination of push and
commit events as described in Section 2.2. This is the total amount of
activity on date t for users of gender g on day of the week d. I include
a fixed e↵ect for activity by users identified as female, Female, in order
to control for baseline di↵erences in activity levels. In each specification,
I consider various fixed e↵ects, including month of year. In other
specifications, these day of week e↵ects are included as controls. I allow
for errors with heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation by using Newey-West
estimator and allowing for a two week lag. I am interested in the coe cients
attached to the interaction between day of week and the female indicator
variable,  d, which capture the di↵erential day of week e↵ects for women.
2.4.2. Results
Men and women display di↵erent daily and weekly work timing, on
average. Figure 2.4 illustrates the di↵erence in activity by hour of day
during the work week, and Figure 2.2 illustrates the di↵erence in activity
by hour of day during the weekend. In Figure 2.3, I plot activity by day of
12
week. Men tend to have a more di↵use work schedule, while female users are
more active during times associated with a traditional work schedule.
FIGURE 2.2. Work Activity by Gender on Weekends
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FIGURE 2.3. Work Activity by Gender Across the Week
2.4.2.1. Work Week
During the week, men and women both have the most activity during
traditional 9am to 5pm work hours. However, the di↵erence between work
during this time and other hours is much more pronounced for women. The
precise estimates for these di↵erences are reported in Table 2.3. Between
6pm and 2am, female work activity declines more than male work activity
for every hour, but the magnitude of the di↵erence varies. The largest
di↵erence occurs between 6 and 7pm. The smallest di↵erence occurs between
8 and 10pm. These details are shown in Figure 2.4.
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TABLE 2.2. Di↵erence in Week Between Men and Women
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Female ⇥ Monday -0.054 -0.054 -0.055
(0.078) (0.074) (0.074)
Wednesday -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.074) (0.071) (0.071)
Thursday 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.079) (0.076) (0.076)
Friday 0.023 0.023 0.022
(0.075) (0.072) (0.072)
Saturday -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.270***
(0.072) (0.069) (0.069)
Sunday -0.260*** -0.260*** -0.262***
(0.071) (0.068) (0.068)
Observations 2922 2922 2922
R-squared 0.841 0.853 0.853
Month No Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Month No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression of the log of activity. The reported
coe cients above are the di↵erential change for woman for the specified time period. E.g.
Female activity decreases 27% more than male work activity on Saturday as compared to
Tuesday. An observation is the total activity for a date for each gender. The reported errors
are Newey-West with a two week lag. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes in
the amount of work from the baseline day of Tuesday. In all specifications, gender is controlled
for.
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TABLE 2.3. Di↵erence in Workday Between Men and Women
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ⇥ 2am to 8am -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.272***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
9am to 3pm 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
4pm to 5pm 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
6pm to 7pm -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.283*** -0.283***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
8pm to 10pm -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.193***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
11pm to 2am -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 50020 50020 50020 50020
R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.753 0.754
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression of the log of activity on the hour of
the day. An observation is the total activity for a date-hour combination for each gender
and includes observations from weekdays only. The reported errors are Newey-West with a
two week lag. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes from the baseline hour of
10am. In all specifications, gender is controlled for. The reported coe cients above are the
di↵erential change for women for the specified time period. E.g. Female activity decreases
19.3% more than male work activity during 6pm to 7pm as compared to 10am work activity.
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FIGURE 2.4. Work Activity by Gender on Weekdays
During the traditional work day, women have less variable work
activity. There is no statistically significant di↵erence between men and
women during 9am to 3pm. Women allocate their work to the 4pm to 5pm
period of time 11% more than men do, but as illustrated in Figure 2.4, this
is because male work decreases during these hours and female work does
not.
In Section 2.5, I explore how child care responsibilities contribute
to di↵erences in male and female work activity. The large di↵erence
between 6pm and 7pm with the lessened di↵erence between 8pm and
10pm is consistent with a story of women having non-work responsibilities




On weekends, male work activity is allocated in a pattern that closely
resembles the weekday work pattern. As shown in Figure 2.2, activity is
highest at 3pm, which is the same as during the week. The sharpest increase
in activity occurs between the hours of 8am and 9am, which is the same as
during the work week as well. Female work activity on weekends is much
flatter across the day, in contrast to the pattern during work days. As
shown in Table 2.4, between 9am and 11pm, male work increases by 45%
compared to the night hours. Female work increases by 19% less than this,
or alternatively, 26%.
One explanation for this flat pattern for women on the weekends is
that women are working less than men on these days. In Figure 2.3, I plot
the coe cients of the regression of work activity by day of week. Activity
by men and women decreases on Saturday and Sunday, but decreases more
for users identified as female. As reported in Table 2.2, female work activity
decreases by an additional 27% and 26% on Saturday and Sunday over the
male decrease in activity. This is roughly equivalent to the magnitude of the
di↵erence between men and women at night.
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TABLE 2.4. Di↵erence in Weekend Day Between Men and Women
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ⇥ 9am to 11pm -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.185***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
9am to 11pm 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.457***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 20056 20056 20056 20056
R-squared 0.759 0.759 0.768 0.769
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression of the log of activity for each hour of the
day. The reported coe cients above are the di↵erential change for woman for the specified
time period. E.g. Female activity decreases 18.5% more than male work activity from 9am
to 11pm. The reported errors are Newey-West with a two week lag. An observation is the
total activity for a date-hour combination for each gender. This table includes observations
from Saturday and Sunday only. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes from the
baseline hour of 7am. In all specifications, gender is controlled for.
2.4.3. Conclusion on Work Patterns
Worker surveys show that women, and especially women with children,
work fewer hours per week than non-mothers even when fully employed.
Using observational data, the above sections show when in the work week
men are working when women are not. Women work a more traditional
Monday through Friday, 9am to 5pm week than men in this data.
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2.5. Gendered Reactions to Childcare Shocks
There a variety of reasons why women may choose to schedule their
work hours di↵erently than men. Women may have a greater taste for
leisure time on nights and weekends than men do. Women could also be
engaged in informal labor that is time-sensitive. In this section, I consider
childcare availability as a key explanation for this variation. Formal
childcare is less available on nights and weekends, and so the comparative
drop in activity on nights and weekends may be because women are taking
care of children more than men are. In order to separate childcare from
other mechanisms, I evaluate unexpected interruptions in the school
calendar.
2.5.0.1. Identification Strategy
I utilize unexpected breaks in the school calendar in order to identify
how men and women respond to childcare availability. I specifically look at
school closures due to snow and other winter weather conditions. Snow days
are helpful in two primary ways. First, snow closures are unexpected and so
individuals are not able to plan for alternative childcare options in advance.
Second, severe weather conditions leading to school closures typically cause
a cancellation in daycare and can impact the ability of at-home childcare
workers (nannies, babysitters, etc.) to commute to the individual’s home or
vice versa. This means that most childcare options will be unavailable to
parents,
For my analysis, I use the following general specification, which
compares the activity on a winter weather school closure day to activity
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on a normal day for both men and women.




Activity is a general term that refers to GitHub push and commit events
as described in Section 2.2. This is the total amount of activity on date t
for users of gender g on day of the week d. I include a fixed e↵ect for users
identified as female, Female, in order to control for baseline di↵erences in
activity levels. Snowday is a indicator variable for winter weather school
closures. The attached coe cient   is the impact of one of these school
closures on the activity of the baseline group. The baseline group in the
specification is the set of users identified as male. The coe cient ↵ captures
the di↵erential e↵ect of a school closure on female activity. I include fixed
e↵ects for the day of the week,  d.
Both ↵ and   are parameters of interest, as they capture the impact
of a snowday on men and women. This paper is specifically interested in the
di↵erential impact of a childcare shock on women, ↵. I allow for errors with
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation by using Newey-West estimation and
allowing for a two week lag.6
2.5.0.2. Results
Table 2.5 summarizes the results of this analysis. My preferred
specification is shown in Column (4). The estimated impact of a school
closure on female-identified users is consistent across the four columns,
although statistical significance does vary. In all four specifications, the
6Estimations with robust standard errors produce similar results.
21
impact of a school closure on male users is not statistically significant. In
my preferred specification, a snow day decreases the amount of activity by
female-identified users by 34%. In my preferred specification, I include day
of week, month of year, female interacted with day of week, and day of week
interacted with month of year fixed e↵ects.
TABLE 2.5. Di↵erence Between Men and Women in Public School
Snowday Response
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ⇥ Snowday -0.310 -0.343* -0.343*** -0.343***
(0.192) (0.192) (0.115) (0.112)
Snowday 0.115 0.132 0.008 0.010
(0.136) (0.136) (0.084) (0.084)
Observations 1032 1032 1032 1032
R-squared 0.917 0.917 0.971 0.974
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression of the log of activity. An observation
is the total activity for a date for each gender. The reported errors are Newey-West with a
two week lag. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes from a non-snowday. In
all specifications, gender is controlled for. The reported coe cients above are the di↵erential
change for woman on a snowday and the change overall.
2.5.1. Threats to Identification
In the following section, I more carefully explore two aspects of the
childcare causality story I am considering.
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It is possible that I am identifying a change in github activity, but
that this activity is hobby- and not work-related. In order to evaluate this,
I conduct my analysis again, but limit the analysis to the subset of activity
that is explicitly associated with top tech companies. 7
In the second part of this section, I proxy for parental likelihood by
controlling for the estimated age of the users. In order to more carefully
identify female users who are likely to have parental obligations, I consider
the e↵ect on women between the ages of thirty and forty. Women in this age
group are more likely to have young children in their household ([21]). As
described in Section 2.2, I connect LinkedIn and GitHub user information to
construct a variable with the approximate age of these users.
2.5.1.1. Company-Owned Projects
In GitHub, I am able to identify if user activity is associated with
a project that is owned by a major tech company. I conduct my main
analysis again using the subsample of activity that is associated with
these companies. This analysis is reported in Table 2.6. When we examine
activity that is explicitly related to a top tech company, the magnitude of
the decrease in activity by women is larger. In this subsample, the decrease
in activity is 66%, whereas the larger sample shows a 34% decrease.
7These companies are as follows: Amazon, Comcast, Facebook, Google, Intel, IBM,
Microsoft, Red Hat, and SAP.
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TABLE 2.6. Snowday Response, Explicitly Company-Related
Activity
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ⇥ Snowday -0.541* -0.666** -0.666** -0.666**
(0.306) (0.304) (0.299) (0.293)
Snowday 0.105 0.167 0.056 0.154
(0.217) (0.215) (0.219) (0.219)
Observations 914 914 914 914
R-squared 0.865 0.868 0.874 0.888
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression on the log of activity. An observation
is the total activity for a date for each gender. The reported errors are Newey-West with a
two week lag. This analysis only includes activity that is explicitly associated with a major
Seattle technology company. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes from a non-
snowday. In all specifications, gender is controlled for. The reported coe cients above are
the di↵erential change for woman on a snowday and the change overall.
2.5.1.2. Estimated Age
In Table 2.7, I report the estimated e↵ect of a school closure on female
activity when considering women between the ages of 30 and 40. When an
indicator variable for women between these ages is included, the overall
e↵ect for women loses statistical significance. Instead, the estimated e↵ect
on women between 30 and 40 is statistically significant and much larger at
approximately -80%. This suggests that the decrease in work activity for
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women overall is being driven by an increase in childcare responsibilities, as
women in this age group are more likely to have young children.
TABLE 2.7. Snowday Response, Estimated Age Included
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ⇥ Snowday -0.377*** -0.126 -0.125 -0.125
(0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.140)
Female ⇥ Thirty to Forty ⇥ Snowday -0.794*** -0.795*** -0.794***
(0.226) (0.226) (0.213)
Observations 972 2834 2834 2834
R-squared 0.904 0.876 0.881 0.885
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression on the log of activity. An observation is
the total activity for a date for each gender-age group. The reported errors are Newey-West
with a two week lag. This analysis includes two age groups, individuals who are estimated to
be between thirty and forty in one group and all others in the other. This age group is used
to identify individuals who are likely to be parents of younger children. The coe cients are
interpreted as percent changes from a non-snowday. In all specifications, gender is controlled
for.
2.6. Robustness
2.6.0.1. Random Female Assignment to Male Coders and Placebo
Snowdays
In the first robustness check, I remove all users identified as female
from the sample. In this new sample, I randomly assign 11 % of users to a
“female” group and evaluate the impact of the snow day school closures on
work activity. I also construct a set of placebo school closures by moving the
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true school closures back one year in time. In this analyses, as reported in
Table 2.9 and Table 2.8, I do not find equivalent statistical significance for
our parameters of interest.
TABLE 2.8. Snowday Response for “Placebo” Snowdays
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ⇥ Placebo Snowday 0.063 0.066 0.066 0.066
(0.191) (0.192) (0.115) (0.112)
Placebo Snowday 0.196 0.195 0.114 0.125
(0.135) (0.136) (0.084) (0.084)
Observations 1032 1032 1032 1032
R-squared 0.917 0.917 0.971 0.974
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I construct “placebo” snowdays by moving the snowday dates to the previous year. These
are dates when Seattle Public Schools did not have public school closures. This table reports
the coe cients from the regression which is run on the log of activity. An observation is the
total activity for a date for each gender. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes
from a non-snowday. In all specifications, gender is controlled for. The reported coe cients
above are the di↵erential change for woman on a snowday and the change overall.
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TABLE 2.9. Snowday Response, “Placebo” Female
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Placebo Female ⇥ Snowday 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.166) (0.167) (0.092) (0.088)
Snowday 0.128 0.130 -0.029 -0.026
(0.118) (0.118) (0.068) (0.066)
Observations 1032 1032 1032 1032
R-squared 0.925 0.925 0.977 0.981
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week No Yes Yes Yes
Month No No Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I construct “placebo” female observations by limiting the sample to only male users and
randomly assigning 11% of these users to a new female group. An observation is the total
activity for a date for each gender. This table reports the coe cients from the regression
which is run on the log of activity. The coe cients are interpreted as percent changes from
a non-snowday. In all specifications, gender is controlled for. The reported coe cients above
are the di↵erential change for woman on a snowday and the change overall.
2.6.0.2. Individual Analysis
In Table 2.10, I consider an alternate specification style. In previous
analyses, the unit of observation is the aggregate activity for a given gender.
In this table, the unit of observation is the individual user. By doing this,
I am able to include individual fixed e↵ects that account for di↵erences
in GitHub interaction style. By doing so, I can control for compositional
changes in the users who are active on any given day. This is not my
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primary specification style as individual users are not typically observed
at a high enough frequency to support this specification style.
TABLE 2.10. Snowday Response, Individual Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Individual Individual
Aggregate Individual 25% of Days 50% of Days
Female ⇥ Snowday -0.343*** -0.072*** -0.173*** -0.214**
(0.112) (0.026) (0.061) (0.102)
Snowday 0.010 -0.028*** -0.027 -0.003
(0.084) (0.007) (0.017) (0.030)
Observations 1032 2.259e+06 913836 435504
R-squared 0.974 0.023 0.050 0.083
Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female ⇥ Day of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of Week ⇥ Month Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Individuals 4,378 1,771 844
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table reports the coe cients from a regression of the log of activity where the unit of
observation is varied. In Column (1) the preferred specification in my analysis is reported
where a unit of observation is the total activity on a date by gender. The reported errors are
Newey-West with a two week lag. In Columns (2)-(4), a unit of observation is an individual’s
total activity on a date. In Column (2), all users in the Seattle Area with identifiable gender
are included. In Column (3), I limit the analysis to users who are present in the data at least
25% of work days. In Column (3), I limit analysis to users who are present in the data at
least 50% of days.
In Column (1), I repeat the preferred column from Table 2.5, the
main specification of this paper. In Column (2), I consider the model
with individual observations and fixed e↵ects. In this column, all users
are included. The decrease for women is statistically significant, but much
smaller in magnitude. In this data, there are many users who interact with
the platform very infrequently which causes the log specification to be less
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than ideal. In Column (3), I repeat this analysis, but only keep users who
are present in the data at least 25% of work days. In Column (4), this is
increased to 50% of work days. As I increase the frequency that users must
be present in the data, we approach the magnitude of the decrease found in
the aggregate analysis.
2.7. Conclusion
For women, there is an increase in happiness associated with having
a family, and an increase in happiness associated with having a career
[22]. Unfortunately, these two increases do not add together to lead to a
happiness premium for women with families and careers [22]. In response to
the demanding nature of raising children while working, we see women exit
the labor force in their 30s and 40s, re-enter as children age, and postpone
retirement [23]. For women who continue in the labor market, there is a
motherhood penalty that has remained near constant in magnitude since
1986 [24].
In this work, I document that the female work week follows a more
traditional pattern than the male work week for the tech workers in my
sample. For women as compared to men, we see that work is concentrated
between 9am to 5am and that work decreases more on the weekends. I use
a natural experiment of unplanned public school closures due to winter
weather to demonstrate that changes in childcare availability impact female
work activity in my sample, but not male. This second analysis is consistent
with the story that appears in the first half of the paper — women are not
working when children are not in school, but men are.
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In this work, I consider the impact of school closures on female work
activity. The implications are potentially much broader. There are many
situations in which households may be faced with an increase in childcare
responsibilities. These circumstances may be idiosyncratic to the individual
household, as in the case of a medical issue for example, and they may also
appear during larger shocks. The results in this paper suggest that school
closures during COVID19 are likely to impact female work activity much
more than male activity. Statistics coming out of the United States Bureau
of Labor and Statistics echo this. In September 2020, approximately 78,000
men and 617,000 women exited the labor force ([25]).
Broadly, life and parenthood are rife with shocks that demand
increased household labor. The results from this paper suggest that these
shocks will impact female workforce activity much more than male. Over a




FATALITIES AND GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS
This chapter is co-authored with Benjamin Hansen and Caroline
Weber.
3.1. Introduction
A fundamental pretext of economics is that increased income should
improve individual outcomes and welfare, holding all else constant. Despite
this axiomatic assumption underlying all economic models (due to free
disposal), only recently have experimental and quasi-experimental papers
begun to explore how income a↵ects labor supply, welfare, and health
[26, 27, 28, 29].
While a variety of studies have concluded that generally increased
income improves outcomes, other evidence has pointed to unseen nuances
not captured in standard models of utility maximizing behavior. For
instance, Ruhm [30] finds recessions, typically seen as avoidable and
undesirable, actually led to fewer deaths in develop countries like the United
States. Likewise, Evans and Moore [31, 32] find evidence mortality increases
substantially on days when paychecks arise. Dobkin and Puller [33] find
overdoses increase on the first of the month when disability payments arrive,
and become more evenly distributed when income payments are distributed
in a staggered manner. Thus despite the broadly accepted conclusion that
income improves welfare, the receipt of income increase human activity
which carries some level systemic risk. This particularly pronounced in
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populations with credit constraints where consumption smoothing is limited
and the permanent income hypothesis appears to fail.
One population that is traditionally credit constrained are recipients of
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Due to concerns
about subsidizing drug use and abuse, some states test for drug use, while
others ban SNAP receipt for those convicted of drug o↵enses. Moreover,
while many studies find SNAP benefits largely increase spending on food,
households have the potential to fiscally substitute between SNAP and other
income. How does drug use respond to in-kind government transfers like
SNAP?
This paper exploits the variation in SNAP receipt timing within the
calendar month to identify the public health e↵ects of government transfers.
Although the federal government funds SNAP, each state is in charge of
administering the program to its eligible residents. We use the variation in
the calendar day(s) of benefit distribution between states, and variation in
distribution regime across time within states, to identify the e↵ect of SNAP
transfers on drug and alcohol related fatal car accidents. Drug related fatal
car accidents proxy for drug and alcohol use within the population.
A state may choose to distribute benefits to all recipients on one
day of the month, or spread distribution out over multiple days. When
distribution is spread over multiple days, each individual within the state
receives all her benefits on one day, but that day is one of a subset of days
that the state distributes benefits on. Considerable research documents
that individuals near their budget constraint do not smooth income shocks
([34]; [35]; [36]; [37]). Instead, an individual rapidly expends income on
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immediate consumption ([35]; [38]; [37]). This spike in consumption allows
us to identify the e↵ect of the transfer. The variation in SNAP distribution
date allows us to construct a control group.
The interaction between government transfers and drug use is of
considerable interest to policymakers [39]. Fifteen states spent 1.3 million to
screen Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) applicants for drug
use in 2016 alone [40]. Screened applicants tested positive at rates between
0 and 2.14, depending on the state [40], which is lower than the national
rate of 9.4 percent [41]. The positive rate of drug testing among TANF
applications should not be misconstrued as the drug use rate, however,
as applicants are aware that testing could be required, and have time to
adjust their behavior accordingly. A benefit of our data is that individuals
do not alter their behavior in response to the data collection. States are
not currently allowed to test SNAP recipients for drug use, but the federal
government is considering allowing them to [42].
Related literature. Our paper is related to a large literature in public,
labor, and behavioral economics studying the e↵ects of government
transfer receipt and timing on household and individual behavior. For a
thorough review, see [43] and [44]. Our work contributes to three strains:
(1) evaluations of the fungibility of in-kind transfers, (2) exploration of
intertemporal smoothing, and (3) documentation of SNAP externalities.
Nearly all empirical research shows the average SNAP household
increases food expenditures more from SNAP receipt than if it received a
cash transfer, but does not spend the entirety of the additional income on
food. Various studies have estimated the marginal propensity to consume
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food (MPCF) out of SNAP income. Administrative records of SNAP
transactions show a MPCF of .5 to .6 [45]. An evaluation of SNAP roll-out
using survey data finds the SNAP MPCF is .16 to .32 with a confidence
interval from .17 to .27 [46]. Additional analysis of survey data, using
a SNAP expansion as variation, finds a MPCF of .53 to .64 [47]. Retail
scanner data, augmented with method of payment data to identify SNAP
consumers, finds a MPCF of .3 [48]. Notably, the SNAP MPCF are all
strictly less than one – which suggests consumers are using the in-kind
transfer to consume non-food goods. We explore a potential outlet for these
remaining funds – drugs and alcohol.
We leverage the cyclicality of spending following income receipt
for our identification strategy. Many studies document the decrease in
food expenditures throughout the month ([49]; [50]; [34]; [51]), where
the beginning of the month is associated with income receipt. For SNAP
specifically, food spending peaks in the first three days after benefit receipt
[37]. Of course, food expenditure is not the same as consumption, and it
possible that consumers purchase storable goods at the beginning of the
month while still smoothing consumption through the month. However,
recent work has shown a decrease in food consumption over the course of the
month as well ([35]; [38]; [37]).
The cyclicality of consumption is connected to a number of
externalities. Test scores for children in SNAP households decrease near
the end of the benefit cycle [52]. Crime increases at grocery stores at the
end of the month [53] and over the course of the welfare benefit cycle [54].
There appear to be significant public health consequences as well. Hospital
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admissions for hypoglycemia increase at the end of the month for low-
income individuals, but not high-income [55]. Hypoglycemia is associated
with a lack of nutrition [56]. On the other side, the initial receipt of income
increases intimate partner violence [57], which the author suggests may be
due to an increase alcohol consumption.
Our work most closely relates to Dobkin and Puller [33], which
documents the relationship between government transfer payments and
hospitalizations for drug-related illness. Drug-related admissions increase
by 23% in the first five days of the month, with a large component of this
driven by Supplemental Security Income recipients. Our work di↵ers in
that we estimate a causal relationship by using exogenous changes in SNAP
distribution dates over time. Additionally, our introduction of expenditure
data allows us to identify the relationship between dollar amount and the
resulting drug and alcohol related mortality.
Structure of paper. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 we provide an overview
of the SNAP program, its implementation in each state, and describe our
SNAP and car crash data. Section 3.6 outlines our research design, including
a detailed explanation of our identifying variation and econometric model.
We provide our results in Section 3.7. We conclude in Section 3.8. An
outline of the next steps in our research is presented in two parts: in the
data section, specifically, Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 we describe the data
components of our extensions. In Section 3.6.1, we describe the research
designs.
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3.2. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides
low-income residents of the United States with food-purchasing assistance.
Participants in the program receive a transfer of funds each month that
can only be spent on food. Although the funds are not cash, they are
redeemable for cash by supermarkets, convenience stores, and food retailers.
The monthly amount varies for each household participating in the program,
and is based on the number of individuals in the household, total income,
and total expenses. The Federal Government pays for the program, and the
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service Division oversees it.
Each state is in charge of administering the distribution of SNAP benefits to
its residents.
SNAP is the second largest government transfer program in the United
States – only Medicaid is larger (Congressional Budget O ce, 2013). 42
million individuals were enrolled in SNAP in 2017 [58], which was around
13% of the population at the time [59]. The average participant receives
125.51 per month in SNAP funds [58], and the total cost of the program was
68 billion in 2017 [58].
Federal food assistance has existed in some form in the United States
since the Great Depression [60]. A pilot program, which eventually became
the Food Stamp Program, was trialed between 1961 and 1964. The Food
Stamp Act of 1964 made the pilot program permanent and extended it to
every state [60]. The 2008 Farm Bill renamed the program the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program [61].
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Distribution Schedules. Each state administers SNAP benefit
distribution for its residents, although the benefit amount is set and paid
for by the federal government. Seven states distribute benefits to every
resident on the same day. The remaining states disburse benefits over
multiple days. Although a state may distribute over multiple days, each
individual within the state receives the entirety of her monthly benefits on
one day. States that distribute over multiple days have a system of assigning
participants to a distribution day. As such, states have chosen to assign
the distribution date by SSN, birthday, last name, and case number. The
last name, birthday, and SSN numbers allow for an additional layer of
identification, which we discuss in Section 3.6.1. See Table 3.1 for a detailed
listing of the date assignment scheme and distribution dates for each state in
2018.
Schedule Transitions. As mentioned above, each state selects the number
of days to distribute SNAP benefits over. Within a state, this choice can
vary over time. Sixteen states switch between distribution regimes, with
three of those states switching more than once. When switching between
distribution regimes, states have chosen to transition in one of three ways: a
simple transition, a 50-50 transition, and a smoothed transition.
Consider some new distribution schedule, Distnew, and an old distribution
schedule, Distold.
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TABLE 3.1. SNAP Distribution Schedules and Schemes, 2017
State Date Range Scheme
Alabama 4 - 23 case number
Alaska 1 -
Arizona 1 - 13 last name
Arkansas 4 - 13 SSN
California 1 - 10 case number
Colorado 1 - 10 SSN
Connecticut 1 - 3 last name
Delaware 2 - 23 last name
District of Columbia 1 - 10 last name
Florida 1 - 28 case number
Georgia 5 - 23 case number
Hawaii 3 - 5 last name
Idaho 1 - 10 birthday
Indiana 1 - 10 last name
Iowa 1 - 10 last name
Kansas 1 - 10 lastname
Kentucky 1 - 19 case number
Louisiana 5 - 14 SSN
Maine 10 - 14 birthday
Maryland 3 - 21 last name
Massachusetts 1 - 14 SSN
Michigan 3 - 21 case number
Minnesota 4 - 13 case number
Mississippi 4 - 21 case number
Missouri 1 - 22 last name - birthday
Montana 2 - 6 case number
Nebraska 1 - 5 SSN
Nevada 1 -
New Hampshire 5 -
New Jersey 1 - 5 case number
New Mexico 1 - 20 SSN
North Carolina 3 - 21 SSN
North Dakota 1 -
Ohio 2 - 20 case number
Oklahoma 1 - 10 case number
Oregon 2 - 20 SSN
Rhode Island 1 -
South Carolina 1 - 19 case number
South Dakota 10 -
Tennessee 1 - 20 SSN
Texas 1 - 15 case number
Utah 5 - 15 last name
Vermont 1 -
Virginia 1 - 9 case number
Washington 1 - 10 case number
West Virginia 1 - 9 last name
Wisconsin 2 - 15 SSN
Wyoming 1 - 4 last name
The above table is a list of the distribution schedules for each state in the United States. We have
omitted Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. These states await data confirmation. The Date
Range refers to the first date of SNAP distribution and the last day. The Scheme is the method of
assigning dates to SNAP recipients. “Case number” means that recipients are assigned a monthly SNAP
receipt date based on their SNAP case number. “Last name” means the receipt date is based on the first
letter (or first three letters) of the recipient’s last name. “SSN” means the last digit of the recipient’s
Social Security Number is used and “birthday” means some aspect of the birthday (year, day, etc.) is
used.
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1. If a state uses a simple transition at some month t:
Distt 1 = Distold
Distt = Distnew
2. If a state uses a 50-50 transition at some month t:
Distt 2 = Distold
Distt 1 = .5Distold + .5Distnew
Distt = Distnew
3. If a state uses a smoothed transition at some month t:













where Distint is some distribution schedule with dates between Distold
and Distnew, and each Distint may or may not be the same. These
switches provide additional identifying variation. Table 3.2 lists each
switch we observe from 1998-2017.
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TABLE 3.2. Changes in Distribution Schedule, 1998-2017
State 1998 Dates 2017 Dates Transition
Alabama 4 - 18 4 - 23 50-50
Delaware* 5 - 11 2 - 23 simple
Florida 1 - 15 1 - 28 50-50
Georgia 5 - 14 5 - 23 50-50
Idaho* 1 - 5 1 - 10 simple
Indiana 1 - 10 1 - 23 50-50
Kentucky 1-10 1-19 smoothed
Maryland* 6 - 10 3 - 23 simple
Michigan 1 - 9 3 - 21 smoothed
Mississippi 5 - 19 4 - 21 simple
Montana 1 2 - 6 simple
North Carolina 3 - 12 3 - 21 simple
Oklahoma 1 1 - 10 smoothed
South Carolina 1 - 10 1 - 19 simple
Tennessee 1 - 10 1-20 simple
Virginia 1 1-9 smoothed
*State experienced more than one switch.
This table describes the transition between distribution schedules for each state that
transitioned. It also lists the old date range and the new date range. The “range” lists the
first date that SNAP benefits are distributed as well as the last date. A few states have
multiple transitions. These states are denoted with a *. To date, each state with multiple
transitions has chosen to transition in the same way, and so we choose to only list the




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data Collection. We construct a novel dataset that details the
distribution dates and date assignment scheme for each state and month
for years 1998 - 2017. We construct our data using a time-series panel
of distribution date ranges for the years 1998 - 2012 from the Economic
Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
We augment this dataset with the specific days within in the range,
see Table 3.3, the distribution scheme, and the transition method for
distribution switches. We also carry the dataset forward to 2017.
These additions are added using the current schedules posted on
the USDA Food and Nutrition Service “When Are Benefits Available?”
webpage, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/snap-monthly-benefit-issuance-
schedule, and historical versions of this webpage available at the Internet
Archive, https://archive.org.
Program Cost and Scope. We use state-month SNAP expenditures
and the count of individuals served for 1998-2017, as detailed in the SNAP
National Data Bank Monthly State Participation and Benefit Surveys.1
3.3. Automobile Collisions
Our analysis focuses on the e↵ect of SNAP distribution on the number
of drug and alcohol related fatal car crashes. Ideally, we would measure
drug and alcohol consumption for each individual who is treated and
not treated with SNAP benefits. We could monitor alcohol and tobacco
expenditures, but this ignores (1) the di↵erence between expenditure and
consumption, and (2) the vast black market for non-legal drugs. Drug and
1https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap
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alcohol related car crashes are a consistent measure of the level of alcohol
and drug consumption in a given community at a specific time.
We use Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data to measure
the number of fatal crashes. FARS is a publicly available dataset maintained
by the National Highway Tra c Safety Administration of the United
States Department of Transportation. FARS records person, vehicle, and
crash information for all fatal car crashes from 1975 to the present. This
information includes if the driver of any vehicle involved in the car is under
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
3.4. Medical Data
We have received approval from the Center for Disease Control’s
National Health Statistics Division (https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/index.htm)
to extend our study to mortality at large using National Vital Statistics
System (NVSS) data. NVSS micro-data and compressed vital statistics files
contain the cause of death codes, exact date of death, and state of death.
Using this data, in future work, we will extend our analysis to every death
in the United States related to drug and alcohol use, and strengthen our
identification by utilizing the variation in disbursement by last name and
social security number (SSN).
3.5. SNAP Roll-Out
At the time of program introduction, SNAP was known as the Food
Stamp Program (FSP). FSP began as a pilot program in 8 counties and
eventually expanded to 43 counties during this pilot program period. The
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Food Stamp Act of 1964 opened the program to all counties in the United
States, but, crucially for our identification strategy, allowed counties to
choose whether to participate [46]. In 1973, the Food Stamp Act was
amended to mandate that all counties participate in FSP by 1975. We use a
dataset of county-month FSP participation as provided in [44].
During this time-period, the NVSS micro-data is publicly available in
pdf files. We are transcribing the pdf files into datasets that track the cause
of death codes, exact date of death, and county of death for all fatalities in
the United States during the FSP rollout period and the years preceding it.
We will use this information in our future work.
3.6. Research Design
Identifying Variation. We use the variation in SNAP disbursement
schedules between states and within states over time to identify the causal
e↵ect of SNAP income on fatal car crashes involving drugs or alcohol. We
are able to use the exogenous variation in SNAP disbursement time, random
across individuals, to approximate random assignment of SNAP treatment.
For each state, we know the percent of SNAP disbursement that occurs on
each day of the calendar month and the average SNAP income per person.
We use this information to estimate three e↵ects: (1) the e↵ect of
distributing SNAP benefits on a day other than the 1st of the month, (2)
the daily e↵ect of SNAP disbursement on drug related fatal accidents, and
(3) the e↵ect of benefit generosity.
The majority of social services distribute benefit checks on the first of



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as well. Following in the work of [53], we examine the impact of adding an
additional income shock to the monthly calendar. This occurs when a state
chooses to move SNAP disbursement from the first of the month, where it
would be grouped with other income, to its own day in the month.
We then consider the impact of SNAP disbursement on the daily
amount of drug and alcohol related tra c fatalities. We construct construct
a “weighted” treatment variable for each day-state combination over time,
that describes the percent of SNAP distributed each day in every state. We
compare the number of fatal accidents involving drugs and alcohol between
states, for each day of the month, as a function of the SNAP distribution
that day for the state. The identifying assumption is that in the absence of
SNAP disbursement, the trend in the number of drug and alcohol related
fatal car accidents would be parallel in all states. We relax this assumption
by including fixed e↵ects, which are detailed in the following section.
Our last analysis examines the impact of benefit generosity on the
number of these fatalities.
Econometric Models.
Our first estimation considers the di↵erence between total monthly
tra c fatalities related to drug and alcohol use in states that distribute
SNAP on the first of the month, and states that distribute SNAP away from
the first of the month. This classification can vary within states across time.
Consider the following estimating equation,
crashsmy =  1multiplesdmy + ↵sy + ✏sdmy
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where crash is the number of drug and alcohol related car crashes in a
state s in month m during year y. Multiple is an indicator variable for
distribution away from the first of the month, in reference to the multiple
income shocks faced by the individuals. We include state-year fixed e↵ects.
Our following two estimations utilize a generalized di↵erences-in-
di↵erences estimation strategy. The first estimation is described by the
following,
crashsdmy =  1percentsdmy + ↵smy +  d + ✏sdmy
where crashsdmy is the number of drug and alcohol related car crashes in
a state s on day d in month m during year y. Our explanatory variable of
interest is percentsdmy, which is the percent of SNAP benefits distributed on
that day. We include state-month-year fixed e↵ects, ↵smy and day of week
fixed e↵ects  d.
The second estimation is described by the following,
crashsdmy =  1benefitsdmy + ↵smy +  d + ✏sdmy
where benefit is the average dollar amount distributed to a SNAP
participant.
Our dependent variable, the number of fatal accidents involving drugs
and alcohol, is a non-negative count variable and therefore we use a Poisson
regression model and assume E(Y |X) = exp(X 0 ). We thus reform our
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{crashsdmyx0i    exp(x0i )  ln crashsdmy!}
For all estimations, we allow the standard errors to cluster at the
state level, which has the additional e↵ect of relaxing the Poisson model
assumption of equality between the mean and variance.2 The coe cients in
the Poisson regression can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, or how a 1 one
unit change in our independent variables predict a percentage change in the
count of fatal car crashes involving drugs and alcohol.
3.6.1. Future Work
National Vital Statistics System. We use the same variation to
identify the e↵ect of SNAP disbursement on drug and alcohol related
mortality at large. NVSS includes patient level data that allows us to add
an additional layer of identification. A subset of states distribute SNAP
benefits based on the last name, the birth date, or social security number
(SSN) of the recipient. This allows us to identify a more narrow group of
potentially treated individuals for our analysis.
Consider the following equation,
deathsdmyi =  1treatsdmyi + ↵smy +  d + ✏sdmyi
2We consider two-way clustering for state and year, but find similar results. Our panel
extends from 1998 to 2017, which provides fewer year clusters than ideal and so we select
year clustering in our preferred regression
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where deathsdmyi is the count of drug and alcohol fatalities in state s
on day d in month m for year y , for individuals that have identifier i. The
identifier can be the first letter of the last name, the last digit of the SSN, or
some aspect of the birth date of the recipient - whichever method the state
uses to select the day of disbursement for residents. Table 3.5 and 3.4 detail
how states chose to distribute SNAP across last names and SSN numbers on
2017. The estimating equation is the same as the car crash analysis except
our key explanatory variable is now treatsdmyi instead of SNAPsdmy, where
treat is an indicator variable for individuals who would receive all of their
benefits on that day if eligible for SNAP.





{deathsdmyix0i    exp(x0i )  ln deathsdmyi!}
Introduction of SNAP. Using the county level rollout of SNAP, we
examine the total number of drug and alcohol related fatalities per month in
SNAP-participating counties compared to non-SNAP-participating counties.
Consider the following equation,
deathcmy =  1treatcmy + ↵c +  y + ✏cmy
where deathcmy is the number of deaths in county c in month m and
year y. Our coe cient of interest is attached to treatcmy which indicates if




Distribution of SNAP on a day other than the first of the month
leads to a 1.21 percent increase in the number of drug and alcohol related
automobile fatalities per month. This point estimate is included in Table
3.6. Our preferred specification, Column(1), includes state-year fixed e↵ects.
The additional specifications include di↵erent fixed e↵ects.
TABLE 3.6. Drug and Alcohol Related Fatal Car Crashes and









These are the results of our estimation of the e↵ect of SNAP benefit disbursement on multiple days on
drug and alcohol related fatal car accidents. Multiple is an indicator variable for distributions that occur
on more than one days of the month. We estimate the e↵ect using a Poisson distribution. The coe cients
in the Poisson regression can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, or how distributing SNAP on more than
one day predicts a percentage change in the count of fatal car crashes involving drugs and alcohol. We
include combinations of fixed e↵ects. An “X” indicates this set of fixed e↵ects was included. Our
preferred specification is Column (1).
We find a one percentage point increase in the share of SNAP benefits
distributed in a state on a day leads to a .11 percent increase in the number
of car crashes involving drugs and alcohol in a state on the distribution day.
Table 3.7 shows this point estimate and its confidence interval and the point
estimates and confidence intervals for three alternate specifications. These
additional specifications include di↵erent fixed e↵ects. In our preferred
specification, Column (1), we include state-year-month fixed e↵ects. These
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fixed e↵ects relax our identifying assumption of parallel trends in drug and
alcohol related fatal car accidents across states across time, to parallel trends
within a a specific year-month combination. Column (2) includes day of
week and state-year fixed e↵ects. In Column (3), we consider year fixed
e↵ects and state fixed e↵ects. In Column (4), we only include day of week
e↵ects. The point estimate is steady throughout the alternate specifications,
with the exception of Column (4), which does not control for time-invariant
di↵erences in unobservables across states.
TABLE 3.7. Drug and Alcohol Related Fatal Car Crashes and
SNAP Disbursement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent .112*** .112*** .113 *** .070**
(.037) (.038) (.038) (.035)
Observations 331,798 331,798 331,798 331,798
Fixed E↵ects





These are the results of our estimation of the e↵ect of SNAP benefit disbursement on drug and alcohol
related fatal car accidents. Percent is the percent of SNAP benefits distributed on a day. We estimate the
e↵ect using a Poisson distribution. The coe cients in the Poisson regression can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities, or how a 1 percentage point change in the amount of SNAP distributed in a day predicts
a percentage change in the count of fatal car crashes involving drugs and alcohol. We include
combinations of fixed e↵ects. An “X” indicates this set of fixed e↵ects was included. Our preferred
specification in Column (1).
Table 3.8 holds the same information for our estimation of the e↵ect
of benefit generosity. We find a one hundred dollar increase in benefit
generosity leads to a .06 percent increase in drug and alcohol related
automobile fatalities.
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TABLE 3.8. Drug and Alcohol Related Fatal Car Crashes and
SNAP Disbursement Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Benefit .00055* .00058 .00089 *** -.0041 ***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 331,767 331,767 331,767 331,767
Fixed E↵ects





These are the results of our estimation of the e↵ect of SNAP benefit amount on drug and alcohol related
fatal car accidents. Benefit is the per person benefit amount distributed on a given day. We estimate the
e↵ect using a Poisson distribution. The coe cients in the Poisson regression can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities, or how a 1 dollar increase in the amount of SNAP benefits distributed on a day predicts
a percentage change in the count of fatal car crashes involving drugs and alcohol. We include
combinations of fixed e↵ects. An “X” indicates this set of fixed e↵ects was included. Our preferred
specification is Column (1).
3.8. Conclusions
Income is something that increases welfare theoretically in essentially
every model of economics. Moreover, empirical evidence largely bears
this out, as non-labor income allows individuals to consume more leisure,
increases in income increase birth weights, reduces stress, and improves
health [26, 27, 28, 62]. However, the activity increased income brings also
increases systemic risk particularly for external causes of injury and death
[30, 32? ]. Despite an extensive literature documenting the benefits of
SNAP, it’s possible and consistent with other evidence on the timing of
income receipt, that SNAP could influence some external risks. Moreover,
based on the extent to which SNAP is fungible with income, and SNAP
receipt allows credit constraint individuals to increase their consumption of
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non-SNAP goods, it’s feasible some of the patterns of income timing and
drug or alcohol use would also manifest themselves with SNAP.
This paper uses SNAP and the variation in SNAP benefit
disbursement across states and time to identify the causal e↵ect of
government transfers on drug and alcohol related car crashes. Distributing
SNAP benefits on days other than the first of the month, adding an
additional income shock to the monthly calendar, increases the number of
drug-related fatal automobile collisions by 1.21 percent. A one-percentage
point increase in the share of SNAP benefits distributed on a day leads to a
.2 percent increase in the number of drug-related fatal automobile collisions.
A one hundred dollar increase in benefit generosity leads to a .06 percent
increase in drug and alcohol related automobile fatalities. Future research
should more fully investigate potential channels, impacts on drug overdoses
more generally, and compare the di↵erences in how income increases map
into drug use versus in-kind transfers like SNAP.
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CHAPTER IV
GETTING INTO THE WEEDS OF TAX INVARIANCE
This chapter is co-authored with Benjamin Hansen, Keaton Miller, and
Caroline Weber.
4.1. Introduction
Tax invariance (TIV)—the principle that who remits taxes does
not influence incidence—is a bedrock principle of tax design. TIV allows
policymakers to focus on minimizing administrative and evasion costs
without worrying about the welfare e↵ects of alternative tax collection
strategies. TIV is routinely taught in “Principles of Economics” courses
[63, 64]. While recent empirical work suggests that TIV can fail under
specific circumstances—when tax evasion opportunities vary along the
supply chain [65, 66, 67], when there are price rigidities [68, 69, 70], or if tax
salience is di↵erent for consumers and firms [71, 72]—it is unclear whether
TIV simply does not hold, or just that it cannot be applied in particular
settings.
We provide a more general test of TIV than has previously been
possible by studying the cannabis market in Washington state.1 The
frequently-audited comprehensive regulatory reporting system makes tax
evasion di cult. Prices both increase and decrease often, which means
rigidities are unlikely. Tax salience is likely high for manufacturers, retailers,
and consumers. Regulatory requirements ensure that owners are highly-
1We describe the market in Section 4.2.
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skilled and well-capitalized. The posted retail prices include all taxes, so
tax-inclusive prices are likely salient to consumers. Finally, tax leakage and
competition are not relevant as the market is closed. Each gram of cannabis
purchased in Washington was grown in Washington, and vice versa, and
neighboring states did not have legal cannabis markets at the time.
We study an ideal reform for testing TIV. Prior to July 1, 2015, a 25%
gross receipts tax applied to each transfer of cannabis. Cultivators remitted
the tax when they sold to manufacturers, manufacturers remitted the tax
when they sold to retailers, and retailers remitted the tax when they sold to
consumers. The retail tax was required to be included in the posted price
making it functionally equivalent to other excise and sales taxes. After
the reform, the retail tax was increased to 37% and all other taxes were
eliminated. Crucially, this change was unexpected by market participants;
the reform was passed on June 27, 2015, and signed by the Governor on
June 30 [73].
We measure the e↵ects of this reform using an interrupted time series
regression in first di↵erences; that is, we ask how prices change in the
week of the reform relative to weeks surrounding the reform. Identification
rests on the assumption that, after controlling for product characteristics,
prices would not have changed in the week of the reform (relative to a
baseline trend) in the reform’s absence. We conduct event study and placebo
analyses which provide no evidence to reject this assumption. We employ
this approach rather than a di↵erence-in-di↵erences design as the only
potential comparison state is Colorado, which had a significantly di↵erent
regulatory and industry structure—the assumption that prices in the two
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states co-move in the period of the reform is likely much stronger than the
assumptions we impose.
Our setting features imperfect competition—retailers have substantial
market power [74, 75] and manufacturers, while more competitive, retain
market power too (see Table 4.1). Given the the emphasis on imperfect
competition in tax incidence analysis [76], we examine how TIV predictions
vary for a percent-based tax—the relevant tax in our setting—depending on
the level of competition. We compare two extremes: perfect competition
and a monopolist retailer and monopolist manufacturer. We show that
manufacturers pass along their entire savings in response to the elimination
of their tax in both situations. Under perfect competition, retailers leave
their tax-inclusive prices unchanged. Under monopoly, retailers cut their
prices to maximize profits under the new system. Our setting lies between
these extremes.
We then examine how manufacturer prices change post-reform. Our
framework predicts that manufacturers’ prices should decrease 28.7% from
pre-reform levels. Given that per-gram tax revenue would fall slightly
in that scenario,2 we also consider a second benchmark, the amount
manufacturers needed to pass-through to leave retailers’ per-gram profits
and consumer-facing tax-inclusive prices constant post-reform (17.7%). We
find that manufacturers reduce their prices by only 7.2%; we reject the null
hypothesis of TIV based on either benchmark at the 0.1 percent level.
Finally, we examine retail behavior. Our framework predicts that
retailers should either leave their tax-inclusive prices constant or decrease
2Revenue would have remained roughly constant if tax-exclusive prices remained
constant—i.e. retailers had passed along their entire tax increase to consumers.
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them. Instead, we find tax-inclusive retail prices increased by an average of
2.5%. Retailers pass through one-third of the tax increase to consumers.
Another roughly one-third is borne by manufacturers, leaving retailers
to bear about one-third of the increase. We find evidence that retailers
maintained constant tax-exclusive markups, consistent with our model’s
pricing rule.
In summary, we find that TIV fails. A reform that should have left the
welfare of manufacturers, retailers, and consumers unchanged or improved
instead increased the profits of manufacturers at the expense of retailers and
consumers. We conclude by discussing potential mechanisms for this result
and implications for policymakers and future research.
4.2. Background
Our analysis focuses on the adult-use cannabis market in Washington
state, which opened in July 2014 after a successful ballot initiative in 2012.
We have written elsewhere about the history of this market [77, 78]—here
we focus on features of the market and the reform that underlie our analysis.
Washington’s cannabis market consists of three types of firms:
cultivators, who grow cannabis plants, manufacturers, who transform
plant material into marijuana products, and retailers, who sell products
they obtain from manufacturers to consumers. Potential entrants have
to pass background checks and undergo a lengthy regulatory process
requiring substantial capital investment before entry. Cultivators face
capacity constraints—the largest firms may cultivate 30,000 sq. ft. of plant
canopy and may not merge to increase capacity. While retailers must be
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financially independent from other firms, a cultivator and a manufacturer
may vertically integrate, though the capacity constraint remains. When
the reform was implemented, approximately 94% (by weight) of usable
marijuana—dried and cured cannabis flowers—was produced through a
vertically-integrated process [79]. Thus, we focus our analyses on two types
of firms, “manufacturers” and “retailers”.3
The market features a closed supply: all cannabis sold by retailers
is grown in the state, and every ounce grown legally within the state
is sold at a Washington retailer. These rules are enforced through the
state’s “seed-to-sale” traceability system, which tracks each plant from
cultivation through processing and retail. This system was implemented
to respond to the informal federal regulations created by the “Cole Memo”
[80]. The system provides information that can be used to check for tax
evasion: retailers cannot sell cannabis without manufacturing records, which
forces manufacturers to report accurately.4 Reporting is enforced through
frequent audits—firms typically face one or more visits per year—backed by
significant penalties for non-compliance.
Washington’s initial tax regime consisted of a 25% tax collected at
every transfer of cannabis. Vertically-integrated manufacturers owed no tax
on intra-firm transfers. The reform we analyze eliminated the 25% excise
taxes within the supply chain and increased the retail excise tax rate to
37%. The excise tax applied to the sales-tax-inclusive price pre-reform and
3State law calls cultivators “producers” and manufacturers “processors”—we choose
nomenclature to represent functional equivalents in other markets.
4Retailers can under-report their sales, but such behavior is detectable as retail sales
can be compared to purchases from manufacturers. Our estimates are una↵ected by
dropping the few retailers that engage in significant under-reporting.
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the sales-tax-exclusive price post-reform. Accounting for changes to the base
and rate of the retail tax, the reform changed the retail tax rate by 6.93%.5
This change was designed to be revenue neutral under the assumption that
tax-exclusive prices remained constant (whereas TIV predicts constant tax-
inclusive prices). We account for both the change in the rate and the base
of the retail excise tax in our analyses. We provide calculations of revenue
pre- and post-reform in Section 4.4. Other regulations concerning cannabis
production, distribution, and sales were una↵ected.
Our identification assumes that the policy change was unanticipated.
The bill originated and was passed in the Washington House during the
2015 Regular Session, but stalled in the Senate. The bill was reintroduced
in the First Special Session, but again stalled. Finally, on June 27, the
last day of the Second Special Session, the bill passed both chambers.
The Governor signed it on June 30 and the law went into e↵ect the next
day. Contemporaneous reporting portrayed the industry as unprepared.
According to one retail manager, “[we] have a few hours to change an entire
market’s pricing structure. It is an exceptionally short window for such a
tremendous change” [73].
4.3. A Framework for Tax Invariance
To motivate our empirical analyses, we introduce stylized models
of manufacturers, retailers, and consumers. We assume a constant
manufacturing marginal cost of mc. Given tax-inclusive retail price p, we








assume demand has constant price elasticity, that is q(p) = kp✏ with ✏ <  1.
We evaluate two extremes: (1) perfectly competitive manufacturers and
perfectly competitive retailers and (2) a monopolist manufacturer and
monopolist retailer. We expect our empirical setting lies between the two
(see Section 4.4).
Let pim be the price charged by manufacturers to retailers including all
taxes. Let pem be the price charged by manufacturers to retailers exclusive of
taxes. Given a manufacturing tax rate of ⌧m, pem = p
i
m(1  ⌧m). Similarly, let
pir be the tax-inclusive retail price and let p
e
r be the tax-exclusive retail price.
Given a retail tax rate of ⌧r, pir = p
e
r(1 + ⌧r). While these definitions are not
parallel, they match our empirical setting.
4.3.1.
Perfect Competition-Perfect Competition In perfect competition,
the tax-exclusive price earned by manufacturers is equal to their marginal
cost, and so the tax-inclusive price is pim =
mc
1 ⌧m . Perfectly competitive
retailers face this price as their marginal cost, and so the tax-inclusive
retail price is pir = mc
1+⌧r







1 ⌧m (⌧r + ⌧m). To see TIV holds, define ⌧ =
1+⌧r
1 ⌧m . Then
pir = mc · ⌧ and TR = k(mc)✏+1⌧ ✏(⌧   1). Given some ⌧ , a policy maker
















m(1 + ⌧r). Note that
the retailer’s tax-exclusive price is a constant markup over their marginal
cost pim. The quantity is q = b(p
i
m)






wholesaler’s problem is maxpim [p
i





1 ⌧m . Thus, the tax-inclusive price charged by the manufacturer



















. Mechanically, if ⌧ is defined
as above, the term in brackets cannot be simplified to be a function of ⌧
alone. Given some pr, if a policy maker shifts ⌧r and ⌧m to hold pr constant,
TR must change. Thus, TIV fails. Intuitively, the percentage taxes act
as demand shifters as in Weyl and Fabinger [76], but the wholesaler does
not internalize the retailer’s response to retail percentage taxes because its
e↵ective demand elasticity is unchanged.
Given TIV generally does not hold in this monopolist-monopolist case,
we want to understand the e↵ect of a movement from a manufacturing tax
to a retail tax. First, suppose that the policy !1 = {⌧r = 0, ⌧m = ⌧}
is replaced with !2 = { ⌧1 ⌧ , 0}. From the equations above, it is clear
that pir (and thus quantities) remains constant. The manufacturer passes
through all of its tax savings, and earns identical profits. However, the
retailer’s profits decrease because the ⌧ savings on the manufacturer’s
price is more than o↵set by the ⌧1 ⌧ tax on their price. By the same logic,
TR increases as "+1" < 1. Now consider the policy !3 = {⌧
0, 0} where




is “naive-revenue-neutral”: it would raise the same total
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revenue if the tax-inclusive retail price was the same after the reform. In




r(!1) and q(!3) > q(!1). Since " <  1,
profits for both firms and total tax revenues increase. Finally, suppose !1
is replaced with !4 = {⌧ 00, 0} where ⌧ 00 is chosen to be “true-revenue-
neutral”: TR(!1) = TR(!4). Since TR(!3) > TR(!1), ⌧ 00 < ⌧ 0 and thus
!4 increases profits for both the retailer and the manufacturer beyond !3.
This is consistent with the notion that, under monopoly, ad valorem taxes
improve welfare over unit taxes [81, 82, 83].
In summary, the combination of market power and percent taxes leads
traditional TIV to fail. However, revenue-neutral policies (whether “naive”
or “true”) that shift taxes from manufacture to retail lead to full pass-
through from the manufacturer to the retailer and a decrease in tax-inclusive
retail prices. Firms and consumers benefit from the change.
4.4. Data and Methods
Our data consist of administrative records from the “traceability”
(or seed-to-sale) system maintained by the Washington State Liquor and
Cannabis Board (WSLCB). We obtain data on all plants, products, and
sales. We restrict our analysis to “usable marijuana” products—74.5%
of the total transactions observed in our data. Within this category,
products are di↵erentiated by “strain” (analogous to fruit cultivars),
potency, and whether the marijuana is loose or pre-rolled into a joint. These
characteristics are captured by our fixed e↵ects.
Harvested flowers and other plant material are converted into an
“inventory lot” that is assigned a unique identifier (ID). Products or
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material within a single inventory lot are assumed to be homogeneous.
Large inventory lots of finished product are split into smaller “retail” lots
for sale to retailers. Each retail lot consists of multiple sealed packages of a
specific weight of cannabis (e.g. 1 gram, 3.5 grams, etc) which are considered
identical. When lots are sold to retailers, the system records the date,
quantity, and price, and assigns a new lot ID. Thus, retail lot IDs uniquely
identify the retailer, manufacturer, cultivator, product, and package size.6
We observe each retail sale and link the price, quantity, and transaction time
to the relevant inventory lots.
We aggregate by inventory-lot-week. We exclude firms with less
than two months of pre- and post-reform data. The reform also changed
technical reporting rules which a↵ect the price data. We clean the price data
for each firm to reflect the prices faced by consumers using an algorithm
based on rounding behavior verified by spot checks of historical menus.7 See
Appendix B for details.
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for retail inventory lots for the
six weeks pre-reform (the basis for our analyses in Section 4.5). The average
tax-inclusive retail price was $13.03 per gram and the tax-exclusive price
was $9.57 per gram. Retailer tax-exclusive prices are more than double
manufacturer tax-inclusive prices. Both manufacturer and retail prices
change week-over-week by more than one percent almost 40 percent of
6A small number of lots have multiple package sizes, which we identify and correct for.
7Cannabis retailers have limited access to financial services and so choose to set tax-
inclusive prices that are round numbers (e.g. $8 or $10.25) to lower cash-handling costs.
While this represents a potential friction, the e↵ective minimum price change is smaller
than the e↵ects we estimate.
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the time, split fairly evenly between price increases and price decreases,
suggesting prices are not rigid.
The average market share of retailers in the 10-mile radius around
their location was 31%, suggesting that there is substantial market power
at retail, consistent with Hollenbeck and Uetake [74] and Mace et al. [75].
The manufacturer market is e↵ectively state-wide and the average market
share is 1.4%. No manufacturer has more than 7% of the total market share.
However, manufacturers may exert market power on individual retailers—on
average, about seven manufacturers supply 75% of a retailer’s inventory.
Across competitive environments, our framework predicts that
manufacturers should pass through their savings to retailers via a log(1  
0.25) =  28.7% decrease in manufacturer tax-inclusive prices. If we estimate
a di↵erent price response to the reform, we can reject the framework. Since
the reform was not quite revenue-neutral, it may be possible to construct
alternative models which both rationalize any price responses we observe
and which feature a TIV result. To rule out this concern, we construct a
second benchmark for manufacturer price changes: given pre-reform prices,
to maintain both a constant tax-inclusive retail price and constant per-gram
retail profits (and therefore to satisfy TIV), manufacturers would have to
decrease their prices by an average of 64 cents, or 17.7%.8
Under a revenue-neutral reform, TIV predicts that retailers would
reduce their tax-exclusive prices by 6.93% (the amount of the change in the
retail tax rate) and maintain constant tax-inclusive prices. Under monopoly,
we predict tax-inclusive prices will decline. As we calculate the reform is
813.03/(1.37+0.089)-13.03/(1.25*(1+0.089)) = 64 cents.
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TABLE 4.1. Pre-Reform Retail Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Prices and Taxes
Tax-Inclusive Retail Price ($/g) 63,668 13.033 3.798
Tax-Exclusive Retail Price ($/g) 63,668 9.570 2.783
Probability of > 1% Retail Price Increase 63,668 0.17 0.375
Probability of > 1% Retail Price Decrease 63,668 0.204 0.403
Manufacturer Price ($/g) 63,668 4.103 1.309
Probability of > 1% Manufacturer Price Increase† 7,954 0.177 0.382
Probability of > 1% Manufacturer Price Decrease† 7,954 0.196 0.397
Retail State + Local Sales Tax Rate 63,668 1.089 0.006
Tax Revenue Pre-Reform ($/g) 63,668 4.489 1.246
Competition
Market Share of Retailer in 10 Mile Radius 63,668 0.313 0.282
Market-level Manufacturer Market Share 63,668 0.014 0.016
Retail-Level Manufacturer Concentration Index 63,668 6.997 2.691
Benchmarks Assuming TIV
Expected Tax Revenue Post-Reform ($/g) 63,668 4.104 1.200
Manufacturer Pass-Through Cents 63,668 -0.640 0.185
Manufacturer Pass-Through Percent Change 63,668 -0.177 0.058
An observation is an inventory-lot-week pre-reform. The data come from our retail
analysis set and cover the six weeks prior to the tax reform. Tax revenue is calculated
using both excise and state and local sales taxes. The retail-level manufacturer
concentration index is calculated as follows: for a given retailer, we sort their suppliers by
the weight of inventory sold, and count the number needed to comprise at least 75% of
total sales. The “benchmarks assuming TIV” account for changes in the base and rate of
the retail excise tax. The “manufacturer pass-through” statistics assume constant
tax-inclusive retail prices and indicate the post-reform changes to manufacturer prices
that would have left retailer variable-profit-per-gram constant.
† These probabilities are calculated for the subset of retail-processor-strain-weight
group-weeks when the inventory lot changes (and thus a new purchase from a
manufacturer has occurred).
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slightly revenue-decreasing,9 our framework suggests retailers should reduce
tax-inclusive prices further.
To summarize, if we estimate a decrease in average manufacturer tax-
inclusive prices of less than 28.7% (in a statistically significant sense), we
reject our model and reject TIV indirectly. If we estimate a decrease in
average manufacturer tax-inclusive prices of less than 17.7%, we reject TIV
directly. If we estimate any increase in retailer tax-inclusive prices, we reject
TIV directly.
Figure 4.1 plots the panel of retail tax-exclusive prices normalized
to the week before reform. For each week, we take inventory lots in their
first week of sale and match them with the price paid to the manufacturer,
restricting observations to those where the first retail sale and manufacturer
sale both happened pre- or post-reform; thus, this illustrates the relation
between retailer per-gram revenue and variable costs. The two series move
in a highly correlated way through the entire pre- and post-reform period
(including the period around April 20, an industry promotional event). This
implies a constant markup of the retail tax-exclusive price over variable
costs (the manufacturer price) that appears to be preserved in response to
the tax reform. This figure depicts a set of products that is changing over
time. To disentangle the e↵ects of the reform from long-run trends and
control for potential compositional changes, we employ regression and (in
Section 4.5.3) event study analyses.
9If prices had remained constant, the reform would have decreased the average total
tax revenue per gram from $4.49 to $4.10.
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FIGURE 4.1. Retail and Manufacturer Prices
This figure plots average prices in Washington’s cannabis industry for four months before
and after the tax reform, normalized to 100 in the week before the reform. For each week,
we take inventory lots in their first week of sale and match them with the price paid
to the manufacturer, restricting observations to those for which the first retail sale and
manufacturer sale both happened pre- or post-reform (before any applicable taxes are
paid from the manufacturer to the government). This therefore illustrates the relation
between retailer per-gram revenue and variable costs. The left dashed line in the figure
marks 4/20 (an industry promotional period) and the right dashed line marks the week
before the tax reform.
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We model responses to the tax reform as an interrupted time-series in
first di↵erences:
 log(pit) = ↵0 + ↵1 TaxReformt + ↵2FEi + uit, (4.1)
where i is described below, and t indicates the week. p is the wholesale or
retail price per gram, TaxReform is an indicator variable that is one after
July 1, 2015 and zero before, and FE are fixed e↵ects. ↵1 is the parameter
of interest.10 Our analysis window spans six weeks before and after the
reform—we examine the robustness of our estimates to this bandwidth.
We two-way cluster standard errors on manufacturer and retail location
[84].11 Our identifying assumption is that within a given product, there
are no shocks in the week of the reform that would have a significant and
systematic impact on prices besides the direct e↵ect of the tax reform.
Given the short interval between observations (i.e a week, not a year), this
assumption is plausible and we will provide placebo regression evidence that
this assumption is reasonable.
For the manufacturer analysis, we aggregate to the manufacturer-
retailer-strain-week level, so that i is a manufacturer-retailer-strain tuple,
and then take first di↵erences.12 Each manufacturer-retailer-strain tuple
does not sell every week. We thus calculate the minimal-length di↵erence
10Without fixed e↵ects, this regression is equivalent to an interrupted time series
regression in levels with fixed e↵ects at the level of our first di↵erences and a control
for time to the reform.
11Firm clusters or two-way clusters on firm and week yield similar standard errors.
12Aggregation beyond the inventory lot is required because each lot is sold only
once. Other possible aggregations produce similar estimates with lower power (though
statistical significance remains).
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and include di↵erence-length fixed e↵ects.13 The maximum di↵erence-length
allowed is 4 weeks. We are thus estimating the magnitude of price changes
in response to the reform within a specific firm-product pairing. When
we add retailer-manufacturer-strain fixed e↵ects, we allow each retailer-
manufacturer-strain to have a separate time trend.
For our main retail analysis, we aggregate to the inventory-lot-week
level so that i is an inventory lot.14 Retail sales from an inventory lot are
frequent, so we construct one-week di↵erences. We are thus estimating the
change in the retail price of an inventory lot in response to the tax reform
holding all possible product and firm variation constant. Sales of retail
inventory lots typically last multiple weeks, so we include fixed e↵ects for
the week since the first week a particular inventory lot sold. When we add
inventory lot fixed e↵ects, we allow prices in each inventory lot to have a
separate time trend.
We separately examine the first week of retail sales for each inventory
lot and include only those that were purchased from manufacturers in the
same week. Similar to our manufacturer analysis, we aggregate by retailer-
manufacturer-strain and take varied di↵erences. We include di↵erence-length
fixed e↵ects. In these regressions, we ask how prices for new inventory lots
purchased post-reform change relative to pre-reform lots of the same strain
from the same manufacturer. This allows us to examine whether prices
13These fixed e↵ects are not significant. Our estimates are similar when restricted to
one-week di↵erences, but with less power.
14We are able to work at this level because retailers repeatedly sell out of a single
inventory lot.
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change more or less if the inventory was purchased post-reform relative to
inventory that had already been purchased and was selling pre-reform.
4.5. Results
4.5.1. Manufacturer Price Response
Table 4.2 reports estimates of Equation (4.1) for manufacturers. The
estimate in Column (1), which includes no fixed e↵ects, implies that prices
changed by -6.5% in response to the tax reform (statistically significant at
the 0.1% level). When we include manufacturer-retailer-strain fixed e↵ects
in Column (2)—our baseline specification—the point estimate becomes -
7.2% (significant at the 0.1% level). This is roughly one-third of the 17.7%
price decrease needed to preserve retailer per-gram profits (and therefore to
minimially satisfy TIV), and one-quarter of the 28.7% decrease predicted
by our framework. We can reject the null hypothesis that our estimate is
consistent with TIV at the 0.1% level. Column (3) repeats Column (2)
for the price in levels instead of logs—we find that the reform decreased
manufacturer prices by 23 cents, about one-third of the 64 cent bound.
Across specifications, the observed price adjustment was greater than 1%
for more than 75% of our observations—suggesting firms were aware of this
reform and prices are not rigid. Even if we rescaled our estimate assuming
that any observation with minimal adjustment was caused by rigidities or
lack of awareness, the data would still reject the null hypothesis of TIV.
The bottom panel of Table 4.2 repeats the specification of each column
for a placebo reform dated one year later. The estimates are near zero across
all four columns, providing support that our regression specifications are
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 Tax Reform  0.065⇤⇤⇤  0.072⇤⇤⇤  0.228⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.018) (0.068)
Observations 12,087 12,087 12,087
Manufacturer Firms 199 199 199




 Placebo 0.001 0.000 0.014
(0.012) (0.014) (0.040)
Observations 21,288 21,288 21,288
Manufacturer Firms 180 180 180
Bandwidth 6 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks
MRS FE? No Yes Yes
This table reports estimates of Equation (4.1) – other variables in that equation are
included, but not reported. An observation is a manufacturer-retailer-strain-week. The
outcome is the change in the log of the price per gram charged by the manufacturer to the
retailer (except for in column (3) which is the same outcome, but not logged). MRS
stands for manufacturer-retailer-strain fixed e↵ects. The estimates are weighted by the
total grams sold across the two weeks of the di↵erence. The P-value tests the null
hypothesis that the estimated pass-through is equal to that predicted by TIV. For the
placebo regressions, we repeat the analysis one year later. These regressions are estimated
with reghdfe in Stata. Standard errors twoway-clustered by manufacturer and retailer
are in parentheses [84]. ⇤5% significance level. ⇤⇤1% significance level. ⇤⇤⇤0.1% significance
level.
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valid. The top panel of Figure B.1 considers bandwidths from 2 to 8 weeks
and confirms that our estimates are not sensitive to the bandwidth chosen.
We provide an event study of these results in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.2. Retail Price Response
Table 4.3 reports estimates of Equation (4.1) for retailers. The
estimate in Column (1), which includes no fixed e↵ects, implies that the
reform decreased the tax-exclusive price by 4.5% (significant at the 0.1%
level). We include inventory lot fixed e↵ects in Column (2)—our baseline
specification. The estimates are very similar; the coe cient in Column
(2) implies that the reform reduced tax-exclusive retail prices by 4.4%
(significant at the 0.1% level). Combined with the rate change, this implies
that tax-inclusive prices increased by 2.5%; retailers passed through roughly
one-third of the tax to consumers. We find that we can reject the null
hypothesis of TIV-consistent pricing behavior at the 0.1 percent level.
As firms might have taken time to adjust (and the Independence Day
holiday may have generated temporary price adjustments), Column (3)
repeats Column (2) for two week di↵erences and drops the first week after
the reform, so that the e↵ect of the reform is identified from the di↵erence
between the week before and the week after the reform. The estimates are
approximately the same, indicating that neither of these concerns play a
large role. We will return to a broader discussion of timing in Section 4.5.3.
Table 4.3 Column (4) repeats Column (2) with the dependent variable
in levels—we estimate that average retail tax-exclusive prices fell by 41 cents
per gram. This implies that retailers are an average of 41 cents per gram
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TABLE 4.3. Retail Tax-Exclusive Price Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 6)
 log(Price)  log(Price)  log(Price)  Price  log(Price)  log(Price)
Tax Reform
 Tax Reform  0.045⇤⇤⇤  0.044⇤⇤⇤  0.046⇤⇤⇤  0.413⇤⇤⇤  0.049⇤⇤ 0.011
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.065) (0.018) (0.017)
 log(Manufacturer Price) 0.887⇤⇤⇤
(0.084)
Observations 145,357 145,357 145,357 145,357 11,265 11,265
Retail Firms 110 110 110 110 110 110
Implied Tax-Inclusive Price Change 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.230 0.020 0.080
P-Value for Test of
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.000
Constant Tax-Inclusive Price
Placebo
 Placebo  0.006⇤ -0.004 0.001 -0.029 -0.016 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009)
 log(Manufacturer Price) 0.642⇤⇤⇤
(0.053)
Observations 253,123 253,123 253,123 253,123 11,534 11,534
Retail Firms 106 106 106 106 105 105
Bandwidth 6 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks
MRS FE? No No No No Yes Yes
Inventory Lot FE? No Yes Yes Yes No No
Di↵erence Length 1 week 1 week 2 weeks 1 week 1-4 weeks 1-4 weeks
Restricted to First Week Sales? No No No No Yes Yes
This table reports estimates of Equation (4.1) – other variables in that equation are
included but not reported. An observation is an inventory-lot-week. The outcome is the
log of the tax-exclusive price per gram charged by the retailer to consumers (except for in
column (4) which is the same outcome, but not logged). MRS stands for
manufacturer-retailer-strain fixed e↵ects. The estimates are weighted by the total grams
sold in the first week of the di↵erence. The P-value tests the null hypothesis that the
tax-inclusive price remained constant as predicted by TIV. For the placebo regressions, we
repeat the analysis one year later. These regressions are estimated with reghdfe in Stata.
In the last two columns we only include observations in their first week of being sold at
retail and only if the cannabis was also purchased from the processor in that same week.
Standard errors twoway-clustered by manufacturer and retailer are in parentheses [84].
⇤5% significance level. ⇤⇤1% significance level. ⇤⇤⇤0.1% significance level.
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worse o↵ on existing inventory as a result of the reform. On fresh inventory,
firms were roughly 18 cents per gram worse o↵ (41 less the estimated 23 cent
decrease in manufacturer prices estimated in Table 4.2). In other words,
under TIV this reform should have caused manufacturer and retail tax-
exclusive prices to fall by 64 cents leaving profit and consumers una↵ected.
Instead, it caused smaller manufacturer price cuts leaving both retailers and
consumers worse o↵.
Table 4.3 Columns (5) and (6) take an alternative approach to
identification examining inventory lots only in their first week and only if
retailers purchased the inventory lot from the manufacturer in that week.
For this, we create a panel of retail-processor-strain-weight group-weeks.
The estimates are quite similar—a 4.9% decrease in Column (5) versus a
4.4% decrease in Column (2), suggesting that retailers’ price responses are
largely una↵ected by whether they are still selling inventory lots purchased
pre-reform or selling new inventory lots purchased post-reform. Column
(6) adds the first-di↵erenced log manufacturer price. When included, the
coe cient on the wholesale price is not statistically di↵erent from one and
the coe cient on  TaxReform is now approximately zero. This suggests
that retailers largely maintained a constant tax-exclusive markup. This is
consistent with the pricing rule derived in Section 4.3. In other words, while
retail behavior as a whole is inconsistent with TIV, after conditioning on the
pass-through from manufacturers, retailers behaved, on average, in a way
consistent with marginal-cost pricing (and therefore potentially consistent
with TIV).
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The bottom panel of Table 4.3 repeats each column in the top panel
for a one-year-later placebo reform. If our estimates are valid, the coe cient
on  Placebo should be roughly zero—exactly what we find. Even in
Column (1) where the estimate is marginally significant, the coe cient is
very close to zero. The bottom panel of Figure B.1 considers bandwidths
from 2 to 8 weeks and confirms that our estimates are not sensitive to the
bandwidth chosen.
4.5.3. Event Studies
The analyses above indicate that prices changed at the time of the
reform—yet it is possible that these changes were part of the ongoing
evolution of the market, something that the placebo tests one year later
cannot rule out. Moreover, the estimates above do not indicate whether
there is additional adjustment towards TIV beyond the first week. To
address these issues, we conduct event studies for both the manufacturer and
retailer responses using our baseline specifications from Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
For manufacturers, we do not drop the t   1 tax reform coe cient due to
our varied di↵erence lengths.15 Figure 4.2 plots the relevant coe cients and
confidence intervals.
In both event studies in Figure 4.2, there is no clear trend in prices
pre-reform. The entire response happens in period t, the reform date.
Given the varied di↵erence lengths for manufacturers, this implies that
manufacturers adjust their prices the first time they sell a particular retail-
strain pair post-reform. This is compelling evidence that our estimates are
15E.g., for a two week di↵erence that spans t-1 to t+1, both the t and t+1 coe cients
are relevant.
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unlikely to be driven by the ongoing market evolution and are instead a
true response to the reform. The immediate nature of the response suggests
that prices in this market follow a unit root, further supporting our first-
di↵erence specification. Moreover, this suggests that our results are not
driven by learning in the short run and there is no evidence in Figure 4.1
to suggest substantial adjustments based on long-run learning either [85, 86].
Appendix Figure B.2 replicates the event study plots one year
later, further emphasizing the placebo findings in previous sections—our
identification strategy is e↵ective in this setting when tested in other periods
with similar cyclicality and holiday patterns. If one wanted a di↵erence-in-
di↵erences design, one could subtract the placebo estimates from the main
estimates in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and take the same approach here for the
event studies. The estimates would be very similar.
4.6. Discussion and Conclusion
TIV is a key component of tax policy design and analysis—it states
that taxes may be collected at any point in the supply chain without
concern as to the ultimate incidence. While the literature has documented
cases in which TIV fails, these results have come with caveats driven by
specific frictions or asymmetries present in the markets studied. We study a
reform in a market with none of the these issues and show that TIV fails.
A reform intended to be welfare-neutral or even welfare-enhancing had
negative consequences for both retailers and consumers.
This result is driven by manufacturers, who on average reduced prices
significantly less than TIV would predict. Conditional on manufacturer
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FIGURE 4.2. Manufacturer and Retail Price Event Study
This figure plots estimates of Table 4.2 Column (2) (top panel) and Table 4.3 Column (2)
(bottom panel) with additional leads and lags of  TaxReform. The plotted coe cients
are leads and lags of  TaxReform. We include in the regression (but do not plot) leads
and lags are for periods t   4 and before and t + 4 and after as is standard in event study
designs. The dots indicate the point estimates and the lines indicate 95% confidence
intervals. See the notes for Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for regression details.78
prices, we find evidence that retailers applied a constant markup over
marginal costs, consistent with our model.
These results are not likely driven by market power; the wholesale
market is more competitive than the retail market and thus we would expect
violations of TIV to be more likely for retailers than for manufacturers.
Similarly, if manufacturers employed average-cost pricing mechanisms
[87, 88], we would expect the reform to cause similar or larger price drops
than under marginal-cost pricing. While the reform eliminated incentives for
ine cient vertical integration and, in the long run, production increased
[79], increased production e ciency should similarly drive down prices.
The frequency of price changes—and the prevalence of at least some drop
in manufacturer prices in response to the reform—suggest that managerial
inattention is not relevant [89]. Our event studies suggest the response is
immediate, which decreases the likelihood that learning can explain our
findings.
Others have found asymmetric firm behaviors in related settings.
Benzarti et al. [90] is particularly relevant—they find increases in value-
added taxes are passed-through to consumers at twice the rate of decreases.
In our setting, retailers, which experienced a tax increase, passed-
through taxes in a way that is consistent with standard models of profit
maximization, while manufacturers, which experienced a tax decrease,
failed to pass-through their savings as predicted. Unlike the VAT context,
however, our setting features a simultaneous change and a marketplace
where firms and consumers are highly aware of relevant prices; furthermore
both retailers and manufacturers engage in repeated transactions with each
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other over a long period of time. More broadly, the industrial organization
literature has identified potential asymmetries in firm responses to changes
in demand and costs [91, 92].
We view our results as consistent with models that generate
asymmetric responses to changes in market conditions due to behavioral
phenomena, as opposed to information, transaction, or competitive frictions.
In particular, anchoring and loss aversion may explain the outcomes we
observe [93, 94, 95]. While the modal response by manufacturers in the
week of the reform was to adjust their prices, the default option of “doing
nothing” by maintaining constant tax-inclusive manufacturer prices (and
thus realizing a significant increase in variable per-unit profits) may have
anchored their negotiations with retail firms. The relatively common and
small changes in manufacturer prices we do observe may be a result of
competition—manufacturers may “do something” if they incorporate
quantity or reputation e↵ects into their analysis of post-tax outcomes [96]
and competitors may be compelled to act as a consequence. In contrast, in
aggregate, retailers may have overcame their default “do nothing” option
(constant tax-inclusive prices) because this option represented a loss in
variable per-unit profit. Once the default was overcome, they made decisions
consistent with profit maximization.
Our findings have wide-ranging implications for tax policy. First,
designers of new taxes may face welfare tradeo↵s when choosing where in
a supply chain to locate a tax. Both e ciency and equity considerations
arise. When considering e ciency, variation in elasticities or competitive
structures across the market may a↵ect optimal tax placement. In terms
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of equity, if a policy goal is to ensure all market participants bear portions
of the tax, it may be necessary to impose taxes on these di↵erent groups
directly.
Second, policymakers considering changes to existing tax policy face
greater consequences for doing so. While it may be possible to implement
revenue-neutral reforms, restructuring will create clear winners and losers.
In this case, manufacturers benefited—despite being in an arguably more
competitive market—while retailers and consumers were harmed.
Taken together, these concerns point to broader political economy
issues surrounding tax policy [97, 98]. Political systems may be designed
to limit the ability of policymakers to enact tax reforms and thus rational
actors may unknowingly design systems which have additional ine ciencies
as described here. Indeed, in Washington state, the legislature may not
reform measures passed by ballot initiative for two years after passage.
Though local government o cials knew from the moment of passage that
the gross receipts tax was likely to have negative consequences on the
market, their hands were tied. Flexibility in political and policy systems
may help avoid these concerns—though at the cost of volatility and
asymmetric responses.
Finally, these results demonstrate a need for further experimental and
modelling work. Modern models of competition, growth, trade, inflation,
and the business cycle generally make assumptions about taxes which are
appealing from a tractability standpoint. These assumptions generally imply
TIV [e.g. 99, 100, 101]. Instead of failures of TIV being the exception, our
work provides evidence that TIV simply may not hold in practice because of
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the ubiquitous nature of default options. In the absence of TIV, it may be
necessary to conduct experiments which examine the way in which firms
and consumers respond to tax policy and construct models which more




In this dissertation, I consider questions related to public and labor
economics in the United States.
In Chapter II, I find both men and women work on evening and
weekends, but men work more than women during these times. I examine
how work activity responds to unexpected winter weather public school
closures and find that Women reduce work activity by 34%. These
results are consistent with the emerging theory that asymmetric childcare
responsibilities could be a reason why men and women in high-wage
professions are working di↵erent amounts on average.
In Chapter III, my co-authors and I find distributing SNAP benefits
on days other than the first of the month increases the number of drug-
related fatal automobile collisions by 1.21 percent and a one-percentage
point increase in the share of SNAP benefits distributed on a day leads to a
.2 percent increase in the number of drug-related fatal automobile collisions.
The public policy implications of these findings are nuanced and should be
taken in context with the marginal propensity to consume drugs and alcohol
from income of all forms.
In Chapter IV, I find, in joint work with co-authors, that tax
invariance does not hold. When a 25 percent tax remitted by manufacturers
was eliminated in Washington state and the retail excise tax was
simultaneously increased from 25 to 37 percent, manufacturers kept two-
thirds of their tax savings instead of passing all their savings through to
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retail firms via lower prices as predicted by TIV. One-third of the retail
tax increase was passed on to consumers via higher retail prices – TIV
would have predicted constant or even declining tax-inclusive retail prices.
These findings suggest that tax policy should be carefully designed from the
beginning, as tax restructuring could have welfare implications.




CHAPTER II SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
FIGURE A.1. Work Day for All Event Types
We observe all public activity in GitHub. This public activity comes in the form of di↵erent
“events”. In the figure above, each line represents one type of event. The majority of event
types follow the same daily cycle, but a few event types are significantly noisier and reflect
a di↵erent temporal pattern. Each of these event types with a di↵erent temporal pattern
represents less than 1% of the data.
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FIGURE A.2. Work Day for Common Event Types
We observe all public activity in GitHub. This public activity comes in the form of di↵erent
“events”. In the figure above, each line represents one type of event. For this plot, we limit
the data to types of events that represent more than 1% of observations. For these event
types, the daily pattern is qualitatively similar. The greatest heterogeneity occurs in the
evening. Events that involve interactions between users are less common in the evening.
For the majority of my analysis, I use “commit” and “push” events. These event types
follow each other closely.
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FIGURE A.3. Work Day Across United States’ Time Zones
All data in GitHub Archive and GitHub Torrent is recorded in Coordinated Universal
Time. I restore local time using the geographic state of the user and the time zone
associated with that state. For states with multiple time zones, I use the time zone that
covers the majority of the state. In the figure above, the data from each time zone is
shown as an individual line. These lines reflect that data after the event times have been
converted from Coordinated Universal Time to local time. The daily work pattern is
similar across time zones.
87
TABLE A.1. Observations by Event Type






















I observe public activity by all users in GitHub. This activity is described as “events”, and
there are many types of events. This table documents the relative occurrence of each type
of event in the data. Commit Events and Push Events are by far the most common events.
Together, these events are 69.9% of the data. A commit event changes the local copy of
a file. A push event changes the copy on the remote server. The remote server is shared
across users who have access to a project. All event types listed above are described in
detail in the Data Appendix, see Table A.2.
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TABLE A.2. Description of Event Types
Event Type Description
Commit Save changes to the local copy of a file.
Push Save changes to the remote copy of a file.
Issue Comment An issue comment has either been created, edited, or deleted. This
comment is attached to an issue that has been filed with existing
code.
Create A new branch or tag has been created. A branch is a copy of the
main work that can be edited without impacting the main work. A
user may choose to make the branch the main work at a later point.
Pull Request When a user would like to contribute code to a project, this new
code is issued as a pull request.
Watch A watch event occurs when someone stars a repository. When a user
stars a repository, they are choosing to follow this project.
Issues The user identifies an issue with existing code.
Pull Request Review Comment A pull request is being reviewed by another member of the project.
Delete A branch or tag is deleted.
Fork A user copies an existing project. This copy is not linked to the
original project.
Gollum Create a Wiki page.
Commit Comment Comment on a commit that has already occurred.
Release Release a new version of a software package.
Member Add or remove a member of a project.
Follow Follow the activity of another user.
Gist Create or update a gist. A gist is a snippet of code.
Public Switch a repository from public to private.
Download Download a package.This event is no longer supported.
Fork Apply Apply a patch to a fork. A patch covers the parts of someone’s fork
that you would like to apply to your code. This event is no longer
supported.
Team Add Add a repository to a team. A team is a group of members. This
team is a subgroup of an organization.
We observe all public activity in the GitHub user platform. This activity can be one of the
types listed above. All activity is described as an “event”. The left column is the event and
the right column describes the event. Files are edited locally. These changes are first saved
locally. These changes can then be saved to the remote server. The events listed above
include actions that a user takes on the local file, actions on the remote version of the file,
and actions on other users’ files.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER IV SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
In this appendix, I detail our data cleaning procedure for Chapter IV
and provide supplementary figures.
I begin by detailing our methods for cleaning prices in the face of
changing reporting requirements and tax rates. I then discuss other cleaning
steps to transform the raw data into the set used in our analyses.
The retail sales prices reported by firms in the “seed-to-sale”
traceability system were supposed to be all-tax-inclusive pre-reform and
tax-exclusive post-reform. However, compliance varied from firm to firm and
changed over time. For example, some firms reported prices with the sales
tax included and some reported prices without the sales tax.
This reporting confusion means that we must infer, for each firm,
how they reported their prices and therefore the true tax-inclusive and tax-
exclusive prices they charged. For each firm-week, we assign a “multiplier”
that reveals the relationship between the reported price and the price faced
by consumers. This chosen multiplier is selected from a set of multipliers
based on possible tax rates for the firm. We merge in the state and local
sales tax rates for each firm in order to construct this choice set.1 To
understand the relationship between the multiplier, reported prices, and
1For five firms, the state and local tax rates do not match the rates they are using, so
we adjust these. And a few firms do not ever change their local tax rate for reporting
purposes—we make that adjustment as well. This transforms these firms from very
unround to very round, but otherwise has approximately no e↵ect on the data as the
di↵erence between the statutory and reported local tax rates is very small.
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faced prices, consider the following equation:
PriceConsumer = PriceReported ⇥Multiplier
We algorithmically determine which tax-based multiplier makes the prices
faces by consumer’s (PriceConsumer) most round for each week, where
roundness is the closeness of the price to a 25 cent increment of a dollar. For
each product type, PriceReported is the modal observed price for the week,
where idiosyncratic discounts have been removed.2
We consider two orthogonal methods of determine the proper set of
multipliers. Our results are robust to the method used. Ultimately, we find
the modal firm never included the sales tax, included the excise tax pre-
reform, and excluded the excise tax post-reform.
B.1. Cash Market Identification
In order to determine how each firm reports their prices in the
traceability system, we take advantage of two characteristics of retail prices.
First, publicly advertised prices (or ‘list’ prices) are nearly universally all
tax-inclusive. Second, retailers nearly always choose to set prices in whole-
dollar or (rarely) quarter-dollar increments.3 We use these two facts to
determine the di↵erence between the list prices faced by consumers and the
prices reported in the traceability system.
2We determine that a price is a one-o↵ discount if the price for that transaction is 5%
to 95% (in increments of 5 percentage points) or 33%/66.67% less than the previously
reported price.
3We verified this through conversations with retailers as well as using historical menus
available through The Internet Archive and a full set of menus for almost all firms we
took screen shots of on 7/18/2017.
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We assign each firm a multiplier before and after the tax change. We
begin by assigning the modal firm’s multiplier choices to all firms—all firms’
prices were adjusted by the state and local sales tax pre-reform and all
firm’s prices were adjusted by the excise tax plus state and local sales tax
post-reform. We then make the following adjustments based on the results
from our algorithm:
1. We leave prices unadjusted (i.e. a multiplier of 1) where are algorithm
finds that this choice maximizes roundedness and at least 85 percent
of weekly sales are round with this multiplier choice.4 This applies to
16% of firms.
2. We adjust the multiplier post reform to account for only the excise tax
when the algorithm finds that this choice maximizes roundness and at
least 85 percent of weekly sales are round with this multiplier choice.
This applies to one firm (out of 110).
There are three additional firms for whom an only excise tax
adjustment makes them most round, but their roundness in the
immediate post period is less than 85 percent. We leave two of the
firms alone because they were also left alone in the pre-reform period
because of unroundness and we could either adjust them both before
and after the reform or leave them both alone with similar e↵ects to
the log price change. The third firm becomes more round a few weeks
4For the 4.5% of firms that suggest the multiplier could be 1 but are quite unround,
there is too much uncertainty to confidently make an adjustment. Leaving these firms’
multipliers unchanged, if wrong, will bias our estimates towards our main null hypothesis
in the retail section of the paper—that firms did not adjust their prices in response to the
reform.
92
after the reform and keeps this multiplier through the end of our data
(and we have confirmed the multiplier in the menu screen shots), so we
make this multiplier adjustment.
3. There are two firms for whom the multiplier that makes them round
post-reform is the excise tax + state and local sales taxes divided by
the state and local sales tax rate. In both cases, we have clear evidence
that this is because they adjusted their prices post-reform by making
their prices sales-tax exclusive post-reform. One firm keeps this choice
permanently and we see this in the menu screen shots at the end
of our data. The other firm eventually adjusts to the modal firms’
multiplier. Our assumption keeps prices roughly constant through this
reporting change.
B.2. Product Batch Price Stability
To provide additional evidence that our multiplier decisions are not
systematically biasing our estimates, we consider a completely di↵erent
mechanism for determining multipliers—we pick the set of multipliers that
makes the tax-inclusive prices for the most number of inventory lots for a
given firm the same pre- and post-reform.
There are a couple of reasons why this is a reasonable alternative to
consider. A number of inventory lots did leave prices constant in response
to the tax reform and the main null hypothesis in our retail analysis is that
firms did not change their tax-inclusive prices—this is what we would expect
if the tax reform was indeed tax invariant.
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We consider two variants of this. One is to begin with the modal
firms’ multipliers and adjust it to another multiplier if it decreases the
number of price changes by any margin. The second variant is to begin
with our estimates based on roundedness and then make adjustments for
firms that under the best set of multipliers leaves at least 25% of their
inventory lots constant in response to the reform. The latter changes the
multipliers for only four firms and three of those four leave the percent price
changes quite similar. The former method decreases our baseline estimate
by 0.4 percentage points and the latter decreases our baseline estimate by
0.2 percentage points. This evidence strongly supports our price cleaning
methods and suggests that any remaining bias is extremely small.
B.3. Additional Cleaning
In addition to adjusting retail prices, we also drop some extreme
outliers in the data. In particular, we drop all wholesale transactions with
a usable weight above 2,500 grams5 and all retail transactions if the usable
weight was above 28.5 grams.6 We also drop all wholesale or retail price per
grams above $42.7 We censor the THC content data if it is zero or above 40
in both the manufacturer and retailer data.8 We also drop wholesale prices
less than $1. This e↵ectively drops samples from our data, which are sold
5This is about 0.025% of wholesale transactions.
6This is because the maximum legal sale was one ounce. This step drops 0.15% of
retail transactions.
7This is less than 0.03% of wholesale transactions and less than 0.04% of retail
transactions.
8This a↵ects 0.2% of wholesale transactions and 5% of retail transactions.
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well below market value. We typically see these as the first recorded sale
from a parentlot.
Lastly, we drop some firms or firm-days in our data set. In particular,
we require for each firm that the first sales transaction occurs two months
before the tax reform and continues to have transactions through the two
months after the reform (either because they had not yet opened, had
closed, or because they took a long hiatus from selling any cannabis). A
few retailers conduct a “soft opening” by opening briefly, closing for more
than a month, and then re-open permanently. In these cases, we drop the
first brief selling period and consider their first activity date the first date
upon re-opening in our data. We also drop 20 retail firms for whom at some
point in the 8 weeks before or after the reform report their data only once
per day—this is a clear indicator of poor overall data quality and, because of
this, determining the appropriate multipliers for these firms is di cult.
B.4. Supplementary Figures
FIGURE B.1. Manufacturer and Retail Price Bandwidth Choices
This figure plots estimates of Table 4.2 Column (2) in the top panel and Table 4.3 Column (2) in the
bottom panel, varying the bandwidth. The bandwidth in our baseline specifications is 6 weeks. The
estimates plotted are for the coe cient on TaxReform. The dots indicate the point estimates and the
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the notes for Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for regression details.
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FIGURE B.2. Manufacturer and Retail Price Event Study
This figure plots placebo estimates of Table 4.2 Column (2) (top panel) and Table 4.3 Column (2)
(bottom panel) with additional leads and lags of  P lacebo. The plotted coe cients are leads and lags of
 P lacebo. We include in the regression (but do not plot) leads and lags are for periods t   4 and before
and t + 4 and after as is standard in event study designs. The dots indicate the point estimates and the
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the notes for Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for regression details.
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